Statistical analysis on market microstructure models by Liu, Feng
Statistical Analysis on Market Microstructure
Models
by
Feng Liu
A Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
the Department of Statistics and Operation Research.
Chapel Hill
2010
Approved by:
Chuanshu Ji, Advisor
Gu¨nter Strobl, Committee Member
Douglas Kelly, Committee Member
Nilay Argon, Committee Member
Shankar Bhamidi, Committee Member
c© 2010
Feng Liu
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii
Abstract
FENG LIU: Statistical Analysis on Market Microstructure Models
(Under the direction of Chuanshu Ji.)
The field of market microstructure studies the trading mechanisms and costs of
providing transaction services, with their impact on the short run behavior of security
prices. Investors are involved in the market for securities and related information. The
cost of a trade depends on the asymmetric information possessed by different partici-
pants in the trade. In this thesis, we perform empirical studies of stock microstructure
data and infer on several market microstructure models. The generalized Roll model
(1984) and Hasbrouck’s (2009) approach, although considered as a good starting point,
are too simple to be realistic. Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) represent two
most important models that involve asymmetric information and transaction costs. We
derive a new characterization of Kyle’s equilibrium model and develop new algorithms
to solve recursive equations with computational efficiency. We also propose an exten-
sion of Kyle’s model in which the private information is gradually revealed into the
security price. Bayesian inference on model unknowns enables us to discover the trad-
ing strategies of the informed traders. These approaches facilitate real applications of
market microstructure models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The need for studies in financial economics becomes more urgent than ever after we have
experienced the recent downturns in financial markets. Statistics play an increasing role
in such studies. In the literature of mathematical finance and related statistical analysis,
most of the elegant results hold under the assumption of a “perfect market” or “fully
efficient market”, i.e. no transaction costs, no bid/ask spread, same information shared
by all market participants, no tax, no limit for short selling, etc. Conceivably that is
far from what happens in real financial markets. The area of market microstructure
studies what factors and mechanisms affect an asset price, how informed traders and
uninformed ones differ in obtaining information and using it to optimize their trading
strategies, etc. Research in this area ultimately will enhance our understanding of the
real markets and have more practical impacts on various issues. That is what we plan
to study.
Microstructure theory focuses on how specific trading mechanisms affect the price
formation process. In a trading market, financial assets are not transformed but trans-
ferred from one investor to another. The field of market microstructure studies the
costs for trading securities and the impact of trading costs on the short-run behavior
of security prices. Costs are reflected in bid-ask spreads. Typical market participants
are the investors who demand or supply the ultimate immediacy and the dealers who
facilitate the trading. An investor usually wishes to trade immediately and to buy low
and sell high. In reality however, traders actually buy at an (higher) ask price and
sell at a (lower) bid price. Those bid/ask prices are quoted by dealers (market makers,
limit order traders), and the spread “ask price minus bid price” is the compensation
that dealers receive for offering immediacy.
The literature on asset pricing often assumes that markets operate without costs
and frictions whereas the essence of the market microstructure research is to analyze the
impact of trading costs and various friction factors. The investors are generally involved
in the market for securities and related information. The market for securities deals
with the determinants of security prices such as earning per share etc. The market
for information deals with the supply and demand of information. It incorporates
the incentives of security analysis and related information transfer. The asymmetric
information is closely related to transaction services since the cost of a trade depends
on the information possessed by the participants in the trade.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are ”informa-
tionally efficient”, or that prices on traded assets already reflect all known information,
and instantly change to reveal new information. Therefore, according to the theory,
it is impossible to consistently outperform the market by using any information that
the market already knows. Investors and researchers have disputed the EMH both
empirically and theoretically. Dreman and Berry (1992) shows low P/E stocks have
greater returns. Behavioral economists Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard
Thaler attribute the imperfections in financial markets to a combination of biases such
as overconfidence, overreaction, information bias in reasoning and information process-
ing. These errors in reasoning lead investors to avoid high-value stocks and buy growth
stocks at expensive prices.
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Market microstructure studies market friction and asymmetric information impact
on security prices. When we look at the security price dynamics with respect to market
microstructure, our focus has shifted from monthly or daily to minute or tick level with
more features such as bid price, ask price, bid size, ask size, trade price and trade volume
etc. The additional features of price and trading dynamics reflect the complexity of
microstructure.
Let Ft be the information set available to the market at time t, the payoff of a
security be a random variable, denote by v. Then the conditional expectation pt =
E(v|Ft) is referred to as the fundamental value or the efficient price of the security.
The information set is the starting point for many microstructure models. One of the
basic goals of microstructure analysis is a detailed study of how informational efficiency
arises, and the process by which new information comes into play or is reflected in
the price movement. In microstructure analysis, transaction prices are usually not
martingales. By imposing economic or statistical structure, it is often possible to
identify a martingale component of the price with respect to a particular information
set.
Roll (1984) suggests a model of high frequency trade prices which incorporate trad-
ing dynamics. This model is fundamental to market microstructure models such that
it illustrates the distinction between price movement due to fundamental security value
and those attribute to the market organization and trading mechanism. To estimate the
effective trading cost and returns formed from daily data, Hasbrouck (2009) advocates
a Bayesian approach based on a generalized Roll model. This method accommodates a
long time span by daily data, and the cost estimate is validated against microstructure
data. Although the Roll model is too simple to capture many realistic features in the
market, it articulates an important aspect of the bid-ask effect on trading price, and
serves as a good starting point.
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The public information set consists of some common knowledge concerning a proxy
of probability structure of the economy, i.e. various possible scenarios of a terminal
security value and associated types of agents. Most models make no provision for the
updates of non-trade public information (e.g., news release). As trading unfolds, the
most important updates to the public information set are market data, such as bid,
ask, closing prices and volumes of trades. Private information may consist of signals
about security value, i.e. more detailed knowledge of the terminal security value.
When all agents are ex ante identical, they are said to be symmetric. This does not
exclude private values or private information. The symmetry means that all individual-
specific variables (e.g., the coefficient of risk aversion, the signal) are identically dis-
tributed across all agents. The Roll model is still informational symmetric. In an
asymmetric information model, a subset of agents has superior private information
which leads to a trading advantage.
The majority of asymmetric information models in market microstructure examines
market dynamics subject to a single source of uncertainty. At the end of the trading, the
security payoff is known and realized. Thus, the trading process is an adjustment from
one well-defined information set to another set. The dynamics are neither stationary
nor ergodic, although path realizations could be stacked to disclose trading behaviors.
There are two main sorts of asymmetric models, among others:
(a) Sequential trade model
Randomly selected traders arrive at the market one by one, sequentially , and
independently . Reference include Copeland and Galai (1983), and Glosten and
Milgrom (1985). In Glosten-Milgrom model, orders arrive and are executed by a
market maker individually. The arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders
are determined exogenously. Informed traders trade when chosen by this mecha-
nism as if they have no future opportunities to trade. In other words, when trade
4
is profitable, they trade as much as possible.
(b) Strategic trade model
A seminal strategic model is studied in Kyle (1985). The Kyle model is a model
of a batch-auction market, in which market makers see the order imbalance at
each auction date. And market makers compete to fill the order imbalance, and
matching orders are executed at market clearing prices. Unlike the sequential
trade model, the strategic informed agent could trade at multiple times. Kyle
develops the optimal trading behavior for the informed trader and shows that the
agent will trade on his information only gradually, rather than exploit it to the
maximum extent possible.
The essence of both models is that a trade from the informed trader will reveal
his/her private information assuming traders are all rational. The ”buy” order orig-
inates from a trader who has positive private information, but not from those who
possess negative information (here we rule out ”bluffing”, i.e. the informed trader is
”bluffing” if he knowingly sells an undervalued or buys an overvalued asset). And the
competitive market makers will set their bid-ask quotes accordingly. In consequence,
greater information asymmetry would lead to wider spreads in quotes. The spread and
trade impact are major empirical implications of these models.
There is an extensive literature in market microstructure. Besides many research
and survey papers, here we mention several good books: Brunnermeier (2001), de
Jong, F. and Rindi, B. (2009), Harris, L. (2003), O’Hara, M. (1995), and Vives, X.
(2008).
Our focus in this thesis is model-based empirical studies. Research in empirical mar-
ket microstructure has two important aspects. On the economic side, certain trading
mechanisms and market frictions, such as transaction costs and asymmetric informa-
tion, are incorporated in a proposed microstructural model with a utility function. The
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resulting constrained optimization problem is tackled, and its equilibrium solution will
yield an optimal trading strategy from the perspective of each market participant, and
a risk-neutral clearing price for every traded asset. In particular, the solution often
enables us to interpret the economic impacts of certain parameters contained in the
model. On the statistical side, inference on model parameters is performed based on
real market data, usually represented by time series of asset prices and returns, trading
volumes, orders and quotes, etc. whether they are daily or involving intra-day activities.
More often than not, goodness-of-fit of the proposed model need not be satisfactory.
Naturally, more sophisticated models can be considered. However, a purely statistical
approach based on goodness-of-fit may not address the issue of economic interpretation.
Financial economists always pay greater attentions to what we can learn from a model.
To reconcile the economic and statistical aspects, a natural “spiral up” development
can start with a basic economic model, fit it by market data; With observed deviations
between the data and the proposed model, we proceed to modify the model and try
to derive the corresponding equilibrium solution, then check it with data again, etc.
The hope is to improve the goodness-of-fit and enhance the understanding of market
behaviors in each new iteration along such a research path.
This approach will be illustrated in a framework of the celebrated strategic trade
model in Kyle (1985). We aim at fitting several extensions of Kyle’s models using intra-
day data, and retaining its interpretability. Dynamic Bayesian modeling [see West and
Harrison (1997)] appears to fit our need, because in many problems sequential updating
between observed data and various unknowns follow a natural path. The unknowns
include model parameters (e.g. market depth and noise trading volatility) and latent
variables (e.g. an inside trader’s order).
Our contributions in this thesis include a new characterization of Kyle’s equilibrium
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solutions. The algorithm we provide offers a computationally more efficient way to char-
acterize the equilibrium solutions, which also enables us to develop similar equilibrium
solutions in certain extensions to Kyle’s model, such as the one with noisy signals of
the asset value observed by the informed trader. We also propose an extended model
to Kyle’s in which the (reciprocal of) market depth {λn} and the informed trading in-
tensity {βn} form time series. A Bayesian inference procedure based on real intra-day
market data (at Wharton’s Database Services) is conducted for this dynamic model.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Several well-known market microstructure
models are summarized in Chapter 2, including the generalized Roll model, sequential
trade and strategic trade models. Chapter 3 describes our pre-modeling data analysis
and key findings which pave the way for our research. In Chapter 4, we present related
research on market liquidity. Chapter 5 outlines the new characterization of Kyle’s
model and inference on an extended model. We propose our dynamic Bayesian model
in Chapter 6 and carry out simulation studies for the Bayesian inference. The empirical
studies based on intra-day microstructure data are performed in Chapter 7. In Chapter
8, we discuss other research topics we have conducted.
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Chapter 2
Basic Formulation and Major
Topics
2.1 Overview
The theoretical aspect of major microstructure research has concentrated on a number
of important models. These models provide useful tools for microstructure research and
results from the models are often directly referenced. Every model contains a number
of parameters. A lot of efforts are devoted to interpret how those parameters impact
market behaviors and investment decisions made by market participants. In contrast,
systematic empirical studies are falling behind, i.e. little has been done in statistical
inference on those proposed models and for model validation. Such limitation would
hinder further development in applications of those models.
2.2 Market dynamics
2.2.1 Price movement and information set
When we look at the security price dynamics with respect to microstructure, our focus
has shifted from monthly or daily to minute or tick level with more features at fine
granularity. Such features include bid price, ask price, bid size, ask size, trade price and
trade volume etc. The following figure illustrates ticker CSCO (Cisco System) traded
on Jan, 3 2002 at second level, data source from TAQ (Trade and Quote) database.
The trade price is augmented by bid/ask price quotes.
Figure 2.1: Sample Cisco trade price, bid, ask quotes
The three prices (bid, ask, and trade) differ. The ask (solid) is always higher than
the bid (dot-dashed), and trades (dashed) usually occurs at posted bid and ask prices,
but not always. They converge to each other. Those features reflect the complexity of
market microstructure.
For simple illustration, consider the evolution of fundamental security value de-
scribed by a random walk. Let pt denote the transaction price at time t, where t index
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regular point of time. The random-walk model with drift is: For t = 1, 2, ...,
pt = pt−1 + µ+ ut, (2.1)
where ut are iid N(0, σ
2) random variables, and µ is the expected price change (the
drift). In microstructure data samples the mean of µ is often small relative to its
estimation variance, i.e, E(µ) < V ar(µ). It is often preferable to drop the mean return
from the model in most microstructure analysis.
When µ = 0, E(pt|pt−1, pt−2, ..) = pt−1, where E(|pt|) <∞ for all t. The pt process
follows a martingale. A more general definition involves conditioning on information
sets.
Let Ft be the information set available to the market at the time t, the payoff
of a security is a random variable, denote as v. Then the conditional expectation
pt = E(v|Ft), for all t is a martingale with respect to sequence of information sets Ft.
When the conditional information is all public information, the conditional expectation
is referred to as the fundamental value of the security.
In microstructure analysis, transaction prices are usually not martingales. By im-
posing economic or statistical structure, it is often possible to identify a martingale
component of the price with respect to a particular information set. In the random-
walk equation (2.1), ut are iid, the price process are time-homogeneous, that is, it
exhibits same behavior whenever we sample it. This is plausible only if the economic
environment underlying the security is also time-homogeneous. Securities like stocks
often violate this condition and are not suitable to be approximated by a random walk.
On the other hand, they usually have well-defined boundary conditions at maturity
that affect their values during the process: securities have different valuation far from
maturity compared to close to maturity. In market microstructure, the short-term be-
havior may still be approximated by a random-walk model, but this model is not a
10
valid choice to describe market behavior in the long-run.
2.2.2 Issues and interpretation
In equation (2.1), price change is ∆pt = pt − pt−1, which is iid with mean 0, variance
V ar(ut) = σ
2, and µ set to 0. When we analyze the actual data samples, the short-run
security price changes always exhibits extreme dispersion and auto-correlation between
successive observations.
For financial security data samples, the price changes at time horizon often have
sample distributions with fat tails. The standard assumption that price changes are
normally distributed is violated. For a random variable X, the population moment of
order α is defined as EXα. If EXα is finite, as x→∞ , then the corresponding sample
estimate
∑
Xαt /T , T is the sample size, is the consistent estimate of of EX
α. To get a
consistent estimate of the standard error of mean, we require a consistent estimate of
the variance. Not all moments are finite if the normal assumption is violated. Recent
studies suggest that finite moments for daily equity returns exist only up to order 3,
and the trading volume only up to order 1.5 (Gabaix 2003). These findings impose
substantial restrictions on the sort of microstructure models we could estimate. The
existence of extreme values in finite samples may lead to many practical consequence.
Increasing the sample size may not increase the precision as fast as we expected, and
estimated parameters are very sensitive to model specification.
The price increments ∆pt in the random walk are iid and uncorrelated. But data
samples show the first-order autocorrelations of price changes are usually negative and
non-zero. For time series ∆pt, the autocovariance and autocorrelation is defined as
γk = Cov(∆pt,∆pt−k) and ρk = Corr(∆pt,∆pt−k). When the mean is zero, γk could
be estimated as the sample average γˆk = T
−1∑T
t=1 ∆pt∆pt−k, and the autocorrelations
as ρˆk = γˆk/γˆ0.
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We collect the data from WRDS TAQ database. The data samples we studied are
MSFT (microsoft Inc) trade prices from Jan, 2 to Jan, 5 2002. There are 200,000+
trades in MSFT at tick level. The estimated first-order autocorrelation of price incre-
ments is ρˆ1 = −0.4561, with standard error of 0.004. The p-value of significance test is
less than 10−5 which rejects zero autocorrelation hypothesis.
We would expect to find ρˆk = 0 for k = 1 for a random walk model. But the
empirical study verifies the contrary. The economic explanation about this contradic-
tion motivates the Roll model, which explains autocorrelations of price increments by
meaningful economic and statistic implication.
2.3 Generalized Roll model
2.3.1 Roll model
Roll (1984) suggests a model of high frequency trade prices which incorporate market
dynamics. This model is fundamental to many market microstructure models such that
it illustrates the distinction between price movement due to fundamental security value
and those attribute to market organization and trading mechanism. The former arises
from the earning capability and future cash flows of the underlying security, whereas the
later are transient due to market behavior. The model provides meaningful economic
interpretation, and in some cases, explains the market movement well.
For t = 1, 2, ...,
pt = mt + c qt, (2.2)
mt = mt−1 + ut, (2.3)
which consists of an observation equation (2.2) and a state evolution equation (2.3),
12
where mt denote the martingale efficient price at tth trade, pt is the trade price. The qt
are direction indictors, which take on the value 1 (buy) or -1 (sell) with equal probability,
the shocks u1, u2, ... are iid N(0, σ
2) random variables, the parameters c > 0 and σ > 0
represent the effective cost and the volatility respectively. The two sequences {qt} and
{ut} are assumed to be independent. Note that only {pt} are observed, while {mt} and
{qt} are treated as latent variables.
The model implies
∆pt = c∆qt + ut, (2.4)
from which it follows that c = [−cov(∆pt,∆pt−1)]1/2, if cov(∆pt,∆pt−1) < 0, and
c = 0, otherwise. The first-order autocovariance is non-zero. ∆pt exhibits volatility
and negative serial correlation as the result of effective cost. The intuition is: If mt is
fixed so that prices take on only two values, the bid and the ask, and if the current
price is the ask, then the price change between the current price and the previous price
must be either 0 or −2c, and the price change between the next price and the current
price must be either 0 or 2c. The moment estimate is feasible, however, only if the
first-order sample autocovariance of the price change is negative.
If the dealers compete to the point where the costs are just covered, the bid and the
ask are mt−c and mt+c, with the spread 2c, a constant. We collect the data of 200,000
trades for MSFT on Jan, 2 to Jan, 5 2002 from TAQ, the first-order autocovariance is
γˆ1 = −0.00522. This implies c = $0.035, and bid-ask spread of 2c = $0.070; while the
estimates from TAQ database shows the bid-ask spread is $0.0625 which is close.
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2.3.2 Hasbrouck’s approach
To estimate the effective trading cost and returns formed from daily data, Hasbrouck
advocates a Bayesian approach based on the Roll model. This method accommodates a
long time span by daily data, and the cost estimate is validated against microstructure
data.
The unknowns comprise both the model parameters {c, σ2} and the latent data {qt}.
We could get posterior distribution f(c|σ2, p1, p2, ..., pT ) and f(σ2|c, p1, p2, ...pT ) via
multivariate Bayesian methods. However, the posterior joint density f(c, σ2|p1, p2, ..., pT )
is not obtained in a closed-form. This motivates the Gibbs sampler. The Gibbs sam-
pler constructs full posterior densities by iteratively simulating from full conditional
distributions for c, σ and qt.
The trading cost estimates from US stocks are formed from daily CRSP data. The
CRSP/Gibbs estimates are very close to TAQ estimates (with correlation 0.96), which
shows that the daily Gibbs estimates have strong validity. The estimation procedure
tries to resolve the two components among the sample price path: the permanent
innovations (due to the efficient price), and the transient effective cost (due to bid-ask
effect). When c >> σ, the bid/ask bounce generates reversals that are easy to pick out
which leads to clear resolution of the two components. When c is relative small, the
bid/ask effect is swamped by innovations in the efficient price.
Empirical sample results:
• Ticker symbol NEWE (Jan 1990) bid = 3.625, ask = 4.125, c ≈ 0.25, daily
volatility σ = 0.031 clear resolution
• Ticker symbol MSFT (Jan 2005) bid = 26.67, ask = 26.68, c ≈ 0.005, σ = 0.073
poor resolution
Although the Roll model captures important aspect of bid-ask effect on trading
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price, it nevertheless lacks completeness in terms of determinants. For expected returns,
it shows weak evidence of trading cost as a characteristic, and it shows no evidence
that the trading cost variation is a risk factor. In fact, Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
argues that c is determined endogenously and is unlikely to be independent of {mt},
the permanent component.
Most microstructure models including Roll model are dynamic over time and have
latent variables. Dynamic latent variable models can be formulated in state-space
form and estimated by maximum likelihood. For Gaussian cases, it could be estimated
using multivariate linear regression; For non-Gaussian latent variables(e.g., the buy/sell
indicator), the estimation procedure often involves nonlinear smoothing or Bayesian
MCMC methods. Hasbrouck’s work sheds light on Bayesian type of analysis.
2.4 Sequential trade model
We begin with Glosten-Milgrom model. Consider one security valued at V ∈ {Vh, Vl},
with Pr(Vl) = δ. The value is revealed at the end of trade. There are two types of
traders: the informed I and the uninformed U , the proportion of informed traders
among the population is µ. The market maker posts bid and ask quotes, B and A. A
trader is randomly drawn from the population. If the trader is informed, he buys if
V = Vh, sells if V = Vl. If the trader is uninformed, she buys or sells randomly with
equal probability. The market maker does not know the types of the trader. A buy is
a purchase by the trader at the dealer’s ask price, A; a sell is a trading at the bid, B.
We assume that the competition among dealers drives the expected profit to zero. The
market maker’s inference given that the first trade is a buy or a sell can be summarized
by his posterior belief about the low outcome.
Let pk(buy), (or pk(sell)) k = 1, 2..., denote the probability of a low outcome given
the kth trade is a buy (or a sell). p0 is the unconditional probability being a low
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outcome, which is δ. Let Bk denote kth order is buy, Sk denote kth order is sell. Then
the market maker’s posterior belief of a low outcome after the first trade is buy is,
p1(buy) = Pr(Vl|B1) = Pr(Vl, buy)
Pr(buy)
=
δ(1− µ)
1 + µ(1− 2δ) , (2.5)
and dealer’s expectation of the value given first buy order is E(V |B1) = Pr(Vl|buy)Vl +
(1 − Pr(Vl|buy))Vh. If competition drives the expected profit to zero, then the posted
”ask price” is the dealer’s expected value.
A = E(V |B1) = δ(1− µ)Vl + (1− δ)(1 + µ)Vh
1− (1− 2δ)µ , (2.6)
The bid price is similar, followed by a sell to the dealer. The dealer saw the first trader
is a sell order and post the bid price.
p1(sell) = Pr(Vl|S1) = Pr(Vl, sell)
Pr(sell)
=
δ(1 + µ)
1− µ(1− 2δ) , (2.7)
B = E(V |S1) = δ(1 + µ)Vl + (1− δ)(1− µ)Vh
1 + (1− 2δ)µ , (2.8)
The bid-ask spread is:
S = A−B = 4(1− δ)δ(Vh − Vl)µ
1− (1− 2δ)2µ2 , (2.9)
The dealer updates his belief and posts new quotes on each trades sequentially. This
process repeats for k=1,2,... This updating procedure could be expressed in general
forms since all probabilities in the event tree are constant except pk(.).
pk(buy|pk−1(.)) = pk−1(.) (1− µ)
1 + µ(1− 2pk−1(.)) , (2.10)
pk(sell|pk−1(.)) = pk−1(.) (1 + µ)
1− µ(1− 2pk−1(.)) , (2.11)
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It can be shown that pk(buy|pk−1(buy), pk−2(sell)) = pk(buy|pk−1(sell), pk−2(buy)), for
all k. The arrival sequence of the buy or sell orders does not matter. Therefore the
proportion of buy or sell orders is deterministic to the outcome.
The conditional expectation of the ask can be decomposed as
A = E(V |buy) = E(V |U, buy) Pr(U |buy) + E(V |I, buy) Pr(I|buy), (2.12)
rearranging terms gives
(A− E(V |U, buy)) Pr(U |buy) = −(A− E(V |I, buy)) Pr(I|buy), (2.13)
In this model, the economic interpretation for equation (2.13) is that the gain from
an uninformed trader on the left side is equal to the loss to the informed trader on
the right side (subject to zero profit expectation for the market maker). There is net
wealth transfer from the uninformed to the informed.
Although the trader is independently drawn from both population for order execu-
tion, one subset of the population (the informed) always trade in the same direction.
The result is that orders are serially correlated. We will do empirical study on this
topic in the next chapter.
One important economic justification of G-M model is trades update the price.
For any security at kth given trade, a buy order on the (k + 1)th trade will make a
upward revision in the conditional probability of a high outcome, and consequently
increase both ask and bid quotes and drive trading price upward. In contrast, a sell
order will drive price downward. The trade price impact is a particular useful empirical
implication.
In the Roll model, we denote {qt} as the trade direction variable (+1 buy, -1 sell)
with equal probability. In the G-M model, the order flow has no equal probability
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attributes to asymmetric information processed by difference traders, the informed
traders always trade in the direction of his knowledge.
The asymmetric information in the G-M model is µ, the proportion of the informed
trader in the population. In equation (2.11) and (2.9), the asymmetric information
parameter µ is positively related to pk(sell), and the bid-asked spread. The justification
behind is when the market have more informed traders, a sell order will be more likely
submitted by an informed trader instead of a uninformed, the probability of a low
outcome after sell is high; similarly, the probability of a high outcome given buy order
is also high. In consequence, the dealer will post wider bid-ask spread in response to
the change of posterior beliefs. These results suggest use of the bid-ask spread or the
impact of an order has on subsequent prices as proxies for the asymmetric information.
We have more discussions in the empirical study.
The limitation of G-M model is the informed traders are drawn randomly by the
market mechanism. When she is selected, she will trade once and the maximum (one
unit of order). There are no trading strategies for the informed trader to maximize her
profit. The order execution timing and order sizes are two important aspects to the
informed in empirical work while remain unaddressed in G-M model.
2.5 Strategic trade model
We follow the basic framework in Kyle (1985) with modified notation.
• Fix an asset in what follows. Suppose N auctions take place sequentially over a
trading period (e.g. day, month, year). For each n = 0, 1, . . . , N , tn denotes the
time for the nth auction, with 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = 1.
• There is a single informed trader who knows the liquidation value V of the asset, and
let Xn denote the aggregate position of the insider trader after the nth auction,
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so that ∆Xn = Xn −Xn−1 denotes the quantity traded by the insider at the nth
auction. However, V ∼ N(p0,Σ0) is considered as a random variable by a set of
noise traders.
• The quantity traded by noise traders at the nth auction is denoted by ∆Un ∼
N(0, σ2∆tn) with ∆tn = tn − tn−1. Assume U1, ..., UN are independent, and V is
independent of {U1, ..., UN}.
• Let pn be the asset’s market clearing price at the nth auction, ∆Yn = ∆Xn + ∆Un
denote the total orders at the nth auction. The information set FUn available to
uninformed traders (including a market maker and all noise traders) at tn consists
of the observations {p1, ..., pn; ∆Y1, ...,∆Yn}.
• The informed trader (insider) has a richer information set available to him before
making his move at the nth auction. Such a set F In−1 includes {X1, ..., Xn−1;V }
in addition to FUn−1. The insider chooses ∆Xn based on F In−1.
• After the move made by both insider and noise traders at the nth auction, the
market maker determines the price pn based on FUn−1 and ∆Yn.
• Let
pin =
N∑
i=n
(V − pi) ∆Xi (2.14)
be the total profits of the insider to be made at auctions n, n + 1, ..., N , and
X = (X1, ..., XN), P = (p1, ..., pN) denote the insider’s trading strategy and the
market maker’s pricing rule respectively. Hence pin = pin(X,P ).
Definition 1. A sequential auction equilibrium is defined as a pair (X,P ) such that
the following conditions hold:
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(C1) (profit maximization) For n = 1, ..., N and all X
′
= (X
′
1, ..., X
′
N) with X
′
i = Xi,
i = 1, ..., n− 1, we have
E[pin(X,P )|F In−1] ≥ E[pin(X
′
, P )|F In−1]. (2.15)
(C2) (market efficiency) For n = 1, ..., N we have
pn = E(V |FUn−1,∆Yn). (2.16)
Definition 2. A sequential auction equilibrium (X,P ) is called a linear equilibrium if
the component functions of X and P are linear, and a recursive linear equilibrium in
which there exist parameters λ1, ..., λN such that
pn = pn−1 + λn ∆Yn, n = 1, ..., N. (2.17)
The following theorem is the major result in Kyle (1985) which proves the existence
and uniqueness of linear equilibrium, and characterizes those modeling parameters in
it.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique linear equilibrium (X,P ), represented as a recursive
linear equilibrium, characterized by (for n = 1, ..., N)
∆Xn = βn (V − pn−1) ∆tn, (2.18)
pn = pn−1 + λn∆Yn, (2.19)
Σn = V ar(V |FUn ), (2.20)
E[pin|F In−1] = αn−1 (V − pn−1)2 + δn−1; (2.21)
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Given Σ0, the parameters βn, λn,Σn, αn, δn are the unique solutions to equations
αn−1 = [4λn(1− αnλn)]−1, (2.22)
δn−1 = δn + αn λ2n σ
2 ∆tn, (2.23)
βn ∆tn = (1− 2αnλn) [2λn(1− αnλn)]−1, (2.24)
λn = βn Σn σ
−2, (2.25)
Σn = (1− βnλn ∆tn) Σn−1, (2.26)
subject to αN = δN = 0 and λn(1− αnλn) > 0.
In Kyle’s model, nobody knows the market clearing price when they submit their
orders. Because the liquidity trader order flow is exogenous, there are really only two
players: the informed and the market maker. The informed trader wants to trade
aggressively on her private information, i.e., buy a large quantity if her information is
positive. But the market maker knows that if he sells into a large net buy customer,
he himself is more likely to be on the wrong side of the trade. He protects himself by
setting a price that is increasing in the net order flow. This acts as a brake on the
informed trader’s desires: if she wishes to buy a lot, she will have to pay a high price.
This is the economic implication of Kyle’s solution to the model.
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Chapter 3
Data Structure and Empirical
Study
We conduct our empirical studies on market microstructure models discussed previ-
ously. The results presented in this chapter motivate us both theoretical and empirical
implications of those models.
3.1 Trade volume or order imbalance
Figure 3.1: Relationship between trade volume and return
The trade volume is the total number of trade orders or trade size at specific time
frame, e.g. daily. The basic sequential trade model has one trade quantity in each trade.
Trades in the real markets, of course, occur in varying quantities. The trade volume is
an important market dynamics. To get a preliminary impression about trading volume
and stock return, we obtain 10 randomly chosen firms, data from Jan 1988 to Dec 2004
from CRSP database, and plot the cross-sectional daily stock return over daily trade
volume in Fig. 3.1. The summary statistics is shown in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of daily returns vs. daily volume
Variables Sample period Observations Mean SD
Return 01/1988 - 12/2004 32890 0.00126 0.022964
Volume 01/1988 - 12/2004 32890 22173.54 30640.38
Variables Max Min Skewness Kurtosis
Return 0.195652 -0.15598 0.06162 3.839
Volume 236675 81 1.63798 2.60493
From Fig. 3.1, we know that volume are quite symmetric across zero return and
high volume does not tend to be associated with high return. In Kyle’s strategic trading
model, the author conjectures a relationship between a firm’s stock price change and its
order flow. In Pasquariello and Vega (2009) empirical study, they address cross-trading
effect with daily aggregated order imbalance. Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) show
that the total number of transactions has greater explanatory power for stock-return
fluctuation than trading volume. We will take similar approach with modified setting.
The intuition is that total trade volumes can be decomposed into sell orders and buy
orders, it is the order imbalance between sell and buy orders which drive the market
movement.
We use intraday, transaction-level data from trade and quotes (TAQ) database
during regular market hours (9:30am to 4:00pm). Corresponding daily price data comes
from CRSP. We obtain MSFT (Microsoft) transaction level trading data on January
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2001 as a starting point. First, we filter the TAQ data by deleting small number of
traders and quotes representing possible data error (e.g., negative prices or quotes).
We then assign the trades using the following procedure.
1. If a transaction occurs above (or below) the prevailing mid-point of bid-ask spread
at that particular time, we assign buy (or sell) sign to that transaction.
2. If the transaction price is at the mid-point of the spread, we will label it a buy
(or sell) if the sign of the last trade price change is positive (or negative).
We define the trade direction variable as +1 (buy) or -1 (sell) for each transaction,
similar to the Roll model. Then we get the signed order flow by multiple trade direction
and order size, denote as ∆ˆyt, where ∆yt = ∆xt + ∆ut in Kyle’s setting.
We denote order imbalance as the total number of signed order flows at given time
period, e.g. daily. We would expect the signed order flows or order imbalance have
greater explanatory power.
3.2 Trade direction
We use {qt}, +1 (buy) or -1 (sell), t = 1, 2... to denote intraday trade directions as we
did in the previous chapter. In the Roll model, qt has equal probability, which implies
E(qt|Ft−1) to get zero in the empirical study. Each trading date has one series of high
frequency trade directions. We got intraday estimates of the first-order autocorrelation
of this high frequency series ρˆk = Corr(qˆt, ˆqt−k), with k = 1. Table 3.2 shows MSFT
first-order autocorrelation for intraday trade directions in Jan 2001.
In table 3.2, the first column is the trading date. Within each trading date, we
got positive correlation between {qt} and {qt−1} as shown in the second column. The
intraday correlation estimates are all strongly nonzero by pearson’s test. We are sur-
prised to get very close intraday positive correlations among all trading dates, with
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Table 3.2: Sample first-order autocorrelation of trade direction
Date Autocorrelation N P-Value
2 0.3306 40237 <0.001
3 0.3049 58859 <0.001
4 0.3331 48718 <0.001
5 0.3341 42902 <0.001
8 0.3559 41755 <0.001
9 0.3543 55388 <0.001
10 0.3837 48945 <0.001
11 0.3232 41093 <0.001
12 0.3545 36273 <0.001
13 0.3653 33158 <0.001
17 0.3529 31529 <0.001
18 0.3786 42356 <0.001
19 0.3526 73470 <0.001
22 0.3871 37743 <0.001
23 0.4009 31299 <0.001
24 0.3995 45075 <0.001
25 0.3954 36869 <0.001
26 0.3934 34915 <0.001
29 0.3666 27078 <0.001
30 0.3769 25538 <0.001
31 0.3449 34231 <0.001
Mean 0.3614 41306.24
Std 0.0270 11258.93
mean 0.3614 and standard error 0.027.
These results have meaningful empirical implications. First, the assumption of the
Roll model is not valid in practice. The sequence of the order types are more likely
to pair with each other, buy after buy, sell after sell. Secondly, this may imply the
asymmetric information processed by difference traders, since the informed traders
always trade in the direction of his knowledge. Finally, this explains how day traders
could make money by following the market. The daily order flows have high probability
to be in the same trade directions sequentially. We would like to address this finding
in our statistical inference.
The intraday signed order flows ∆ˆyt on the other hand do not exhibit positive
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autocorrelation, it is not significant against zero hypothesis. The order sizes are indeed
exogenous along the time horizon (e.g. 500 size order could be followed by another 10
or 2000 size order).
3.3 Asymmetric information
In G-M model, the asymmetric information is µ, the proportion of the informed trader
in the population. The asymmetric information parameter µ is positively correlated to
pk(sell), and the bid-asked spread from the previous chapter. These results suggest use
of the bid-ask spread or the impact of an order has on subsequent prices as proxies for
the asymmetric information. We study the intraday bid-ask spread movement across
one year.
Figure 3.2: MSFT intraday bid-ask spread movement
Fig. 3.2 depicts the MSFT intraday bid-ask spread movement in year 2001. From
the figure, we know that the intraday bid-ask spread are disjoint and stable. And the
market maker does not post irrational bid-ask spreads based on trade price movement.
The conclusion is that this spread remained constant at least for intraday or short time
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period (i.e., one week).
On the other hand, we look at the trade price movement vs. the bid-ask spread. Fig.
3.3 illustrates the trade price movement in corresponding year. The bid-ask spread does
Figure 3.3: MSFT trade price movement
not have strong correlation with the trade price either positively or negatively. The
spread contains dealer’s posterior inference about the degree of informed traders, and
this measurement is constant at short period. In Fig. 3.2 and 3.3, dealer’s posterior
beliefs about the degree of asymmetric information is decreasing, therefore we have
seen higher spread in January-April than later the same year, while the trade price still
move upward or downward in both directions.
The degree of informed trading among total market participants may not change in
the short time period, at least from the dealer’s viewpoint (dealers only see aggregated
order flow, not distinguished one). This implies that the market maker makes no
inference when he see the total order imbalance at tick level. He will shift the whole
bid-ask band rather than change the spread itself.
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3.4 Market depth
The market depth is an important characteristics of market dynamics. It refers to the
size of an order flow innovation required to change the price in a given amount. In
Kyle’s framework, the market depth is λ−1n , with pn = pn−1 + λn∆Yn for n = 1, ..., N .
It deals with order imbalance with respect to the price increment. We do empirical
studies at intraday transaction level.
First, we present the aggregated intraday transaction level order imbalance across
trade price increments. Figure 3.4 illustrates MSFT aggregated order imbalance vs.
price changes at each trading date using microstructure data. The correlation between
Figure 3.4: Aggregated intraday order imbalance vs. price change
the two series is 0.76. The results show strong explanatory power of order imbalance
in the price change movement.
We conjecture the market depth (or λn) is constant in Kyle’s model. We use regres-
sion to do our analysis. The t-statistics for λ coefficient is 5.09, with p-value less than
10−5 which rejects zero coefficient null hypothesis. The line fit chart is depicted in 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Line fit with market depth (or λn)
The empirical results show that the market depth could be modeled with the intro-
duction of order imbalance or signed order flow. These findings have significant impact
on the model inference.
In Kyle’s model, the informed trader wants to trade aggressively on her private
information, i.e., buy a large quantity if her information is positive. But the market
maker knows that if he sells into a large net buy customer, he is more likely to be on
the wrong side of the trade. He protects himself by setting a price that is increasing in
the net order flow. This acts as a brake on the informed trader’s desires: if she wishes
to buy a lot, she will have to pay a high price. If there is an imbalance between buy
and sell orders, the market maker makes up the difference in the Kyle’s model. The
results assert that it is the order imbalance that drives the price movement (price set
by the market maker).
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3.5 Market liquidity
In the previous section, we considered the liquidity parameter λ, and the results show
that demanding liquidity has a cost. Intuitively, if you demand high liquidity, the price
would be high. In Kyle’s single period trading model, the λ takes following form:
λ =
√
Σ0
2σ
, (3.1)
√
Σ0/σ is ratio of volatilities, i.e., the value uncertainty vs. the noise order uncertainty.
Therefore, the λ ∆Y is like a liquidity risk, where ∆Y is the total order imbalance.
λ ∆Y =
√
Σ0
2
∆Y
σ
, (3.2)
∆Y/σ is proportional to the percentage of order imbalance. The higher σ, the lower
the price impact. It is scaled by the value uncertainty
√
Σ0. The higher the security
value uncertainty, the higher the price impact.
The factor model starts with Fama and French (1992), which shows that factors
related to company size and BtoM (Book to Market) ratio are able to explain a signifi-
cant amount of the common stock variation in stock returns. They run the three-factor
model of the form:
Fama and French 3-factor
Rjt−Rf t = αj + βj (Rmt−Rf t) + γj SMBt + ξj HMLt + jt, (3.3)
where Rjt is the return to portfolio j for time t, Rf t is the risk-free return for time t.
SMBt is the small cap stock vs big cap stock, and HMLt is the high BtoM stocks vs
low BtoM stocks. We would conjecture market liquidity as an additional factor given
that demanding liquidity has a cost.
30
Chapter 4
Liquidity in market microstructure
models
4.1 Liquidity and expect returns
Financial markets deviate from the perfect-market ideal in which there are no impedi-
ments to trade. A large and growing body of work has identified a variety of market im-
perfections, ranging from information asymmetries, participation costs, different forms
of trading costs, inventory risk(i.e., the market maker, being exposed to the risk of price
changes while he holds in inventory, requires compensation), to search frictions(i.e., a
tradeoff between search and quick trading at a discount) etc. These cost of illiquidity
should affect the securities prices if investors require compensation for bearing them.
In addition, because liquidity varies over-time, risk-averse investors may require a com-
pensation for being exposed to liquidity risk. These effects of liquidity on asset prices
are important. Most papers focus on theoretical study of a specific imperfection that
predicts how liquidity affects a security’s expected return and/or the empirical connec-
tion between the two. The basic premise in these studies is that illiquidity is positively
related to the expected returns.
We start the overview with different liquidity measures, and explore the effect of
liquidity on assets expected returns by empirical evidence. The literature on liquidity
is vast. Madhavan (2002), Bias, Glosten and Spatt (2005), Cochrane (2005), Vayanos
and Wang (2009) have surveyed on liquidity and asset prices. While the effects of
imperfections on market liquidity and further on expected returns have received much
attention, their focuses are expected returns and mostly based on factor models, i.e,
adjusted CAPM, adjusted Fama-French models etc. We then distinguish our work from
those related literature such that we study the origins of illiquidity(e.g., in the form of
bid-ask spreads or market impact) and fundamentals of the imperfections on the price
movement with high frequency microstructure data.
4.2 Liquidity measures
One strength of a frictionless economy is that a security’s cash flows and the pricing
kernel are sufficient statistics for the pricing operation described as:
pt = Et{ (pt+1 + dt+1) mt+1
mt
}. (4.1)
where mt is the stochastic discount factor, dt is the dividend process. Equation (4.1) is
the main building block of standard asset pricing theory. The assumption of frictionless
market is combined with no arbitrage, agent optimality and equilibrium. No arbitrage
means that one can not make money in one state of nature without paying money in
at least one other state of nature. Agent optimality derives investor’s optimal portfolio
choice only on a solution in the absence of arbitrage. If the investor’s preferences are
represented by an additively separable utility function Et
∑
s us(cs) for a consumption
process c, then mt = u
′
t(ct) is the marginal utility of consumption. In a complete
market, agents i = 1, ..., I with separable utility functions ui compete to a competitive
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equilibrium, (4.1) is satisfied with utility function ut =
∑
i λ
iuit where λi is the Pareto
Weights and depend on agents’ endowments. In a frictionless market, the assumption
of no arbitrage is essentially equivalent to the existence of a stochastic discount factor.
That means the pricing kernel summarizes all the needed information contained in
utility functions of agents, endowments, correlation with other securities etc.
In an economy with frictions, the price depends additionally on the security’s liq-
uidity and the liquidity of all other securities. In some liquidity models, there still
exists a pricing kernel m such that (4.1) holds. In this case, illiquidity affects mt, but
the pricing of securities can still be summarized using a pricing kernel. The empirical
analysis of Pastor and Stambaugh(2003) is based on an assumption that there exists
an m that depends on a measure of aggregate illiquidity. In other models of illiquidity,
however, there is no pricing kernel such that (4.1) applies. For instance, in transaction-
cost-based models, securities with the same dividend cash flows have different prices
if they have different transaction costs. Hence, a security’s transaction cost not only
affects the nature of market equilibrium, it is the fundamental attribute of the security.
If there does not exist a pricing kernel, the general equilibrium prices with illiquidity
may depend on the fundamental parameters in a complicated way that does not have a
closed-form expression. Nevertheless, we still can get important insight into the main
principles how liquidity affects assets expected return under certain assumptions and
with the assistance of empirical studies.
We consider the challenges of choosing a liquidity measure L. The problem of
estimating liquidity on asset returns relies on how to measure liquidity since there
is hardly a single measure that captures all of its aspects. Moreover, measures used
in empirical studies are constrained by data availability. High-frequency data that
enable the estimation of liquidity from the actual sequence of trade and quote become
available in U.S only recently and are thus available for a relative short period of time.
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Consequently, researchers requires a long time series to increase the power of the tests.
In stock market outside U.S., high frequency data are hardly available, researchers
need to find other measures of liquidity using low-frequency data, such as daily return
data, and trading volume etc. The empirical studies from related work employ various
measure of liquidities.
4.2.1 Bid-ask spread
Amihud and Mendelson(1986) studies the liquidity on stock’s expected return using
quoted bid-ask spreads. These predictions are tested using stock returns over the
period 1961-1980 and data on quoted relative spreads. The spreads are the average of
the beginning- and end-of-year end-of-day quotes, collected from Fitch quote sheets for
NYSE and AMEX stocks. The estimation model is:
Rj = a+ b βj + c ln(Sj). (4.2)
where Rj is the monthly stock portfolio return in excess of the 90-day Treasury Bill rate,
βj is the systematic risk, estimated from the preceding period, and Sj is the relative
bid-ask spread. All coefficients are significant.
The model’s estimations are: (1) the portfolio return increases with the bid-ask
spread, which is the main result. (2) the return-spread slope decreases in the bid-
ask spread, reflecting concavity which is due to clientele effect. In equilibrium, less
liquid assets are allocated to investors with longer holding periods, which mitigates the
compensation that they require for the costs of illiquidity. (3). the size effect reflects
an aspect of liquidity - it is less costly to trade stocks of large companies - then the size
effect should weaken if stock expected return equation includes the bid-ask spread, i.e.,
the bid-ask spread is known to be negatively related to firm size.
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between stocks’ excess monthly returns and bid-ask spreads
While on NYSE and AMEX, individual investors could trade through limit orders
that had priority over the specialist’s quotes and thus avoid the cost of spread although
incurring the cost of risk and delay, on Nasdaq trading are done mostly through mar-
ket makers, and investors have to endure the cost of spread. The estimated effect of
the bid-ask spread is expected to be stronger when using Nasdaq stocks than NYSE
and AMEX. This is shown in Eleswarapu(1997), who estimates a model where stock
return is regressed on the stock’s beta, relative spread and log(size). The estimation is
performed for individual stocks employing Fama and MacBeth method. The consistent
significant effect is the relative spread which has positive effect.
4.2.2 Kyle’s λ
A finer measure of illiquidity is Kyle’s λ, which is used by Brennan and Subrah-
manyam(1996); Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2007) and Chordia et al (2009).
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Chordia et al. named it ”theory-based” illiquidity as it originates from Kyle’s frame-
work.
Brennan and Subrahmanyam(1996) estimate λ by regressing the price change, on
the transaction size. The slope coefficient from the regression is Kyle’s λ which measures
the price impact of a unit of trade size, being larger for less liquid stock. The regression
model also includes φ = Dt −Dt−1, where Dt = 1 for a buy transaction and Dt = −1
for a sell transaction. The coefficient of this differential, φ, reflects the fixed cost of
trading that is unrelated to the order size. The illiquidity variables that are used
are: (1) Cq = λ q/P , the average of the marginal cost of trading, where q and P are
monthly averages of trade size and price. (2) φ/P , the relative fixed cost of trading.
These measures of illiquidity are then used in a cross-section regression of monthly
NYSE stock returns for the years 1984-1991. The regression model employs Fama and
French (1992) three factors model in addition to the illiquidity variables: The market
return index, the small-minus-big firm return indexes and high-minus-low book-to-
market return index.
The results show that Cq have a positive and significant effects on returns adjusted
by Fama-French factors. In addition, C2q has a negative and significant effect, consistent
with Amihud and Mendelson (1986) clientele effect that generates an increasing and
concave relationship between returns and illiquidity costs.
Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2009) consider the illiquidity λ in Kyle-type
framework with extension to N informed traders and each informed trader i observes a
signal with an error i, i = 1, 2, ...N , where i ∼ N(0, v). The asset payoff is W = W˜+δ,
where W˜ is expected payoff, and δ ∼ N(0, vδ). The informed traders maximize their
expected profit, while the uninformed traders who trades randomly and submit order
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size, z ∼ N(0, vz). The author shows the Kyle’s measure λ is given by:
λ =
vδ
(N + 1)vδ + 2v
√
N(vδ + v)
vz
. (4.3)
where N is the number of informed traders. vδ is the variance of the asset payoff,
vz is the variance of uninformed trades, v is the variance of signal innovation. Note
that this measure requires proxies, for instance, a proxy for the variance of the signal
innovation, as well as that of the signal itself. Each of those variance is represented
by different proxies. vδ is proxied through the earnings volatility from the most recent
eight quarters. v is proxied by the earnings surprise defined as the absolute value of
the current EPS minus the EPS forecast four quarters ago. vz is proxied by the average
daily dollar volume (in million dollars) within the previous month.
The main model is still multi-factor model. The key contribution is that it uses
Kyle’s λ to derive a liquidity measure and to establish the connection between liquidity
and expected returns.
4.2.3 Daily returns, trading volume and ILLIQ
Researchers often use alternative measures based on daily data on volume, shares out-
standing, and prices, which are available for most markets.
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam(1998) uses stock’s dollar trading volume as
a measure of liquidity in a multi-factor asset pricing model, version of the APT. Datar,
Naik and Radcliffe (1998) use stock turnover (the ratio of stock volume to the number
of shares outstanding) as a measure of liquidity. The logic behind the scene is that if
in equilibrium less liquid stocks are allocated to investors with longer holding periods
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986), or investors reduced their trading frequency of illiquid
stocks (Constantinides, 1986), then even though liquidity is not directly observed, it
37
can be inferred from the average holding period of the stock, which is the reciprocal of
the stock turnover. Datar et al. estimate the cross-section of NYSE stock returns on
stock returns in years 1963-1991, controlling for size, book-to-market ratio and beta,
employing the Fama and MacBeth method. The result is that the longer the average
holding time which implies lower liquidity, or low turnover, the high the expected
return.
Amihud (2002) examines the effect of illiquidity on the cross-section of stock returns
using an illiquidity measure called ILLIQ, where ILLIQ = |R|/(P ∗ V OL), where R
is daily return, P is the closing daily price and V OL is the number of shares traded
during the day. Intuitively, ILLIQ reflects the relative price change that is induced by
a given dollar volume, which is related to Kyle’s pricing impact λ, but on a daily basis.
4.3 Liquidity risk
Liquidity varies over time which means the investors are uncertain what transaction cost
they will incur in the future. Secondly, since liquidity affects the level of prices, liquidity
fluctuations can affect the asset volatility itself. For both reasons, liquidity fluctuations
constitute a new level of risk that impact the fundamental risk. This section explores
liquidity models of the effect of a security’s liquidity risk on its expected returns.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) presents a model which gives rise to a ”liquidity-
adjusted CAPM” model that shows how liquidity risks are captured by three liquidity
betas, and how shocks affect future expected returns. Re-writing the one-beta CAPM
in net returns in terms of gross returns, we get a liquidity-adjusted CAPM for gross
returns. Acharya and Pedersen introduce three liquidity betas, βL1, βL2, βL3.
Et(r
i
t+1) = r
f + Et(c
i
t+1) + λt(βt + β
L1
t − βL2t − βL3t ). (4.4)
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where λt = Et(r
M
t+1 − cMt+1 − rf ) is the risk premium. Et(cit+1) is the expected relative
illiquidity cost. The models states that the required excess return is the expected
relative cost plus four betas times the risk premium.
The first liquidity beta βL1t measures the covariance between the asset’s illiquidity
and the market illiquidity. The model implies the expected return increases with this
covariance, because investors want to be compensated for holding a security that be-
comes illiquid when the market in general becomes illiquid. The second liquidity beta
βL2t measures the exposure of asset i to marketwide illiquidity, which is usually nega-
tive. This beta affects return negatively because investors are willing to accept a lower
return in times of market illiquidity. The more negative the exposure to the market
illiquidity, the greater is the expected return. The third liquidity beta βL3t measures the
sensitivity of the asset’s illiquidity to the market conditions. This beta is also negative
for most stocks.
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Chapter 5
Inference on an Extended Kyle’s
Model
Research in empirical market microstructure has two important aspects. On the eco-
nomic side, certain trading mechanisms and market frictions, such as transaction costs
and asymmetric information, are incorporated in a proposed microstructural model
with a utility function. The resulting constrained optimization problem is tackled, and
its equilibrium solution will yield an optimal trading strategy from the perspective of
each market participant, and a risk-neutral clearing price for every traded asset. In
particular, the solution often enables us to interpret the economic impacts of certain
model parameters contained in the model. On the statistical side, inference on model
parameters is performed based on real market data, usually represented by time series
of asset prices and returns, trading volumes, orders and quotes, etc. whether they
are daily or involving intra-day activities. More often than not, goodness-of-fit of the
proposed model need not be satisfactory. Naturally, more sophisticated models can
be considered. However, such purely statistical approach may deviate us from an in-
terpretable economic framework, and it may not be clear what we can learn from an
improved model even it fits data better.
This work begins with the celebrated strategic trade model in Kyle (1985). It aims
at fitting a modified version of Kyle’s model using some intra-day data, and retaining
its interpretability. Our study consists of three parts:
[1] an alternative characterization of the equilibrium solution to Kyle’s model;
[2] derivation of the equilibrium solution to an extended Kyle’s model in which the
informed trader observes a noisy signal of the asset value;
[3] A case study of simulated equilibrium solutions.
[4] MCMC dynamic Bayesian inference on a proposed extension of Kyle’s model in
the next chapter.
Kyle (1985) proves the existence and uniqueness of a linear equilibrium solution in
which the parameters are derived via a set of recursive formulas. In Part [1], we provide
a new method to reproduce those parameters. Our method is computationally more
convenient and direct. It also paves a road for deriving equilibrium solutions to certain
extended models. One extension is analyzed in Part [2], in which the informed trader
observes a noisy signal of the asset value v instead of vitself. In Part [4], we perform
Bayesian inference on an extended model based on real microstructure data.
5.1 New derivation of Kyle’s equilibrium solution
Recall the basic framework and major result in Kyle (1985).
• Fix an asset in what follows. Suppose N auctions take place sequentially over a
trading period (e.g. day, month, year). For each n = 0, 1, . . . , N , tn denotes the
time for the nth auction, with 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = 1.
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• There is a single informed trader who knows the liquidation value v of the asset, and
trades a quantity ∆xn at the nth auction. However, v ∼ N(p0,Σ0) is considered
as a random variable by (uninformed) noise traders.
• The quantity traded by noise traders at the nth auction is denoted by ∆un ∼
N(0, σ2u∆tn) with ∆tn = tn − tn−1. Assume ∆u1, ...,∆uN are independent, and
they are also independent of v.
• Let ∆yn = ∆xn + ∆un be the batch order at the nth auction, and FUn−1 denote the
information set available to uninformed traders (including a market maker and all
noise traders) at the beginning of the nth auction, consisting of the observations
{p1, ..., pn−1; ∆y1, ...,∆yn−1}, where pi represents the asset’s market clearing price
determined at the ith auction.
• The informed trader (insider) has a richer information set available to him before
making his move at the nth auction. Such a set F In−1 includes {∆x1, ...,∆xn−1; v}
in addition to FUn−1. The insider chooses ∆xn based on F In−1.
• After the move made by the insider at the nth auction, the market maker determines
the price pn based on FUn−1 and ∆yn.
• Let
pin =
N∑
i=n
(v − pi)∆xi (5.1)
be the total (future) profits of the insider to be made at auctions n, n+ 1, ..., N ,
and X = (∆x1, ...,∆xN), P = (p1, ..., pN) denote the insider’s trading strategy
and the market maker’s pricing rule respectively. Hence pin = pin(X,P ).
Definition 3. A sequential auction equilibrium is defined as a pair (X,P ) such that
the following conditions hold:
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(C1) (profit maximization) For n = 1, ..., N and all X
′
= (∆x
′
1, ...,∆x
′
N) with ∆x
′
i =
∆xi, i = 1, ..., n− 1, we have
E[pin(X,P )|F In−1] ≥ E[pin(X
′
, P )|F In−1]. (5.2)
(C2) (market efficiency) For n = 1, ..., N we have
pn = E(v|FUn−1,∆yn). (5.3)
Definition 4. A sequential auction equilibrium (X,P ) is called a linear equilibrium if
the component functions of X and P are linear, and a recursive linear equilibrium if
there exist parameters λ1, ..., λN such that
pn = pn−1 + λn∆yn, n = 1, ..., N. (5.4)
The following theorem is the major result in Kyle (1985) which proves the existence
and uniqueness of linear equilibrium, and characterizes those modeling parameters in
it.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique linear equilibrium (X,P ), represented as a recursive
linear equilibrium, characterized by (for n = 1, ..., N)
∆xn = βn (v − pn−1) ∆tn, (5.5)
pn = pn−1 + λn∆yn, (5.6)
Σn = V ar(v|FUn ), (5.7)
E[pin|F In−1] = αn−1 (v − pn−1)2 + δn−1; (5.8)
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Given Σ0 and σ
2
u, the parameters βn, λn,Σn, αn, δn are the unique solutions to equations
αn−1 = [4λn(1− αnλn)]−1, (5.9)
δn−1 = δn + αn λ2n σ
2
u ∆tn, (5.10)
βn ∆tn = (1− 2αnλn) [2λn(1− αnλn)]−1, (5.11)
λn = βn Σn σ
−2
u , (5.12)
Σn = (1− βnλn ∆tn) Σn−1, (5.13)
subject to αN = δN = 0 and the second order condition
λn(1− αnλn) > 0. (5.14)
5.1.1 The original derivation of Kyle’s solution
As is suggested on page 1325 in Kyle (1985), combining (5.11) and (5.12) yields
(1− λ2nσ2u∆tn/Σn)(1− αnλn) =
1
2
, (5.15)
which is a cubic equation in λn, given nonnegative values of αn, Σn and σ
2
u. (5.15) has
three real roots. The middle one is the only solution that satisfies the second order
condition. Overall, the sequences {λn}, {βn}, {αn}, {δn} and {Σn} can be determined
by iterating n = N,N − 1, ..., 1 backwards, given a pair (Σ0, σ2u) and the boundary
condition αN = δN = 0. Since ΣN is also unknown, we have to set an initial value
arbitrarily and run a search until it converges. The detail is given as follows.
Given Σ0, σ
2
u and the boundary condition αN = δN = 0, an iterative algorithm
consists of the following steps:
S1: Make an initial guess Σ∗N for ΣN ;
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S2: Get λN =
√
Σ∗N
σu
√
2∆tn
using αN = 0 and (5.15);
S3: Set n = N ;
S4: Get βn and Σ
∗
n−1 from (5.12) and (5.13);
S5: Get αn−1 from (5.9);
S6: Solve the cubic equation (5.15) and use its middle root for λn−1;
S7: Replace n by n− 1 and go to S4 if n > 0;
S8: If |Σ∗0 − Σ0| >  where  is a prescribed error bound, go to S2 with a different
initial value Σ∗N , and repeat ...
This backward induction search algorithm contains an outside loop and an inside
loop: the outside loop, as shown in S1 — S8, determines Σ∗N up to an acceptable error,
while the inside loop solves a cubic equation for each n in S6. Even for a fixed pair
(Σ0, σ
2
u), the computational complexity for a desirable target result is O(N
2). However,
we can only fix (Σ0, σ
2
u) in a simulation study. In an empirical study using real market
data, Σ0 and σ
2
u have to be treated as unknowns and estimated. Conceivably, the
required computational complexity for that task will increase rapidly and make the
algorithm impractical. That is why we propose the following alternative algorithm,
which is more efficient and has not been explored, to the best of our knowledge.
5.1.2 An alternative characterization of Kyle’s solution
Proposition 1. Assume the same conditions in Theorem 2 with ∆tn =
1
N
∀ n, and let
dn = αnλn. Then for every n = N,N − 1, ..., 1 (running backwards and in particular,
dN = 0 follows from αN = 0), there exists a unique real root dn−1 ∈ (0, 1/2) for the
cubic equation
8 d3n−1 − 8 d2n−1 − 2 Kn dn−1 +Kn = 0, (5.16)
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where
Kn =
1
1− 2dn . (5.17)
Other parameters in Theorem 2 are determined iteratively by
Σn =
1
2(1− dn) Σn−1, (5.18)
λn =
[
(1− 2dn) Σn
2(1− dn)∆tn σ2u
]1/2
, (5.19)
βn =
1− 2dn
2λn (1− dn)∆tn . (5.20)
Furthermore, the sequence {dn} satisfies the property
1
2
> d1 > d2 >, ..., > dN−1 > dN = 0. (5.21)
The sequence {dn} plays a central role in obtaining other parameters in Kyle’s
model. dn has two factors: αn as the coefficient for a quadratic utility function repre-
senting the expected future (at auctions n, n+1, ..., N) profit from the informed trader;
and λn as a measure for the market depth (a smaller value of λn corresponds to a deeper
market). There is another important parameter βn, which models the informed trad-
ing intensity. The following proposition, derived from Proposition 1, depicts how the
sequences {βn} and {λn} will evolve as more auctions take place.
Proposition 2.
βn
βn−1
, hn =
√
2(1− dn−1) 1− 2dn
1− 2dn−1 > 1 (5.22)
λn
λn−1
, kn =
√
1− 2dn
1− 2dn−1
1− dn−1
2(1− dn)2 >
1
2
. (5.23)
See Appendix for detailed proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
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Remark: There are several advantages for the proposed algorithm given in Proposition
1.
• Computational efficiency: With this algorithm, the cubic equation (5.16) only need to
be solved for each n once for all, i.e. it does not depend on the values of Σ0 and σ
2
u.
Therefore, this part of computation is purely off-line. Having solved for the entire
sequence dn, n = N − 1, ..., 1, we can run a forward algorithm, with n = 1, ..., N
and an assigned pair (Σ0, σ
2
u) to obtain other sequences {λn}, {βn}, {αn}, {δn} and
{Σn}. Suppose we have done the calculation for a given N , and decide to run it
again for a larger N ′ > N . Then we can reuse the result of dN , dN−1, ..., d1 for
dN ′ , dN ′−1, ..., dN ′−N+1, and continue to calculate only new values for dN ′−N , ..., d1.
Moreover, the only computational errors involved in the new algorithm come from
numerical solutions for (5.16). No “trial-and-error” with different values for Σ∗N
in the previous numerical search is required. The greater value of N , the more
efficient the new algorithm will be.
• From Proposition 2, we learn that the informed trader increases his orders as more
auctions take place. As trading unfolds and more information is released to him,
the insider has no incentive to hide his private information hence trades more
aggressively. Following our derivation, neither ratio βn/βn−1 nor ratio λn/λn−1
depend on any other parameters in the model, except for the auction horizon
N . However, the initial values β0 and λ0 do depend on the inputs Σ0 and σ
2
u
[see (5.12)], and such dependence will carry on in subsequent values βn and λn.
Once the sequence {dn} is solved, ratios for both sequences will be uniquely
determined. Moreover, the sequence {βn} exhibits a consistent growth, while λn
does not reveal this property.
• As we mentioned, our main objective is to improve goodness-of-fit for an extended
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Kyle’s model in parameter estimation with real data. The new algorithm turns
out to offer a useful clue for what extensions we may consider. We will elaborate
on that part in the next section.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the numerical results of {dn} sequence given number of
periods N . {dn} is a decreasing sequence as we expect. It also shows that the beginning
portion of {dn} sequence are concentrated within the range of 0.45−0.5 when the total
number of periods N > 10. When N is large, {dn} would be decreasing slowly for the
majority of time periods, and drop sharply at the end of trading.
Figure 5.1: {dn} series with various sample periods N
We illustrate the patterns of λn and βn in figure 5.2 given same initial condition with
different sample periodsN . βn represents the insider’s strategy while λn is the reciprocal
of market depth. βn is an increasing sequence under Kyle’s equilibrium model, and it
follows a pattern of flat at the beginning and gradually more steep toward the end of
trading periods. If we compare βn across different N , the results are favorable to the
insider if he is trading in a longer time horizon, in which he could exercise his strategy
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over longer periods. The λn sequence is at no surprise. It flattens out through the
entire time horizon, and drop at the end of trading periods.
Figure 5.2: {βn} and {λn} series with various sample periods N
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at each auction
5.2 An extension of Kyle’s model
In this section, we consider an extended Kyle’s model in which the informed trader
observes a noisy signal about true value v at each auction, but not v itself. We will
focus on the case of sequential (multiple) auctions after skimming over the single period
case.
5.2.1 The single period case
Consider an asset with payoff v ∼ N(p0,Σ0). The quantity traded by noise traders is
denoted by u ∼ N(0, σ2u). Different from the original Kyle’s model, here we assume
the informed trader observes a signal s = v +  at the beginning of the period where
 ∼ N(0, σ2 ). Conditioning on s, the informed trader maximizes his expected profit
by choosing his trading strategy x. Assume that v, u, and  are independent of each
other. There is a competitive risk-neutral market maker, who sets the asset price as
p(y) = E(v|y) based on the batch order y = x+ u.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique equilibrium (X,P ), in which the insider’s trading
strategy X and the market maker’s pricing rule P are linear functions of s and y
respectively:
x(s) = β (s− p0), (5.24)
p(y) = p0 + λ y, (5.25)
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where
λ =
Σ0
2
√
σ2u(Σ0 + σ
2
 )
, (5.26)
β =
√
σ2u
Σ0 + σ2
. (5.27)
Proof: Let pi = [v − p(y)] x. Following the linearity assumptions (5.24), (5.25) and
conditioning on the signal s, the informed trader will choose x = x(s) to maximize his
expected profit
E(pi|s) = E[(v − p0 − λy) x|s]
= x E(v − p0|s)− x λ E(x+ u|s)
= x E(v − p0|s)− λ x2, (5.28)
where the projection theorem implies
E(v − p0|s) = Cov(v − p0, s)
V ar(s)
(s− Es)
=
Σ0
Σ0 + σ2
(s− p0)
= γ (s− p0), (5.29)
with
γ =
Σ0
Σ0 + σ2
. (5.30)
Maximizing E(pi|s) with respect to x leads to −2λx+ E(v − p0|s) = 0, hence
x = β (s− p0) (5.31)
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with
β =
γ
2λ
. (5.32)
Furthermore, the projection theorem and (5.25) imply
p(y) = E(v|y)
= p0 +
Cov(v, y)
V ar(y)
(y − Ey)
, p0 + λ y, (5.33)
and
λ =
Cov(v, β (v − p0 + ) + u)
V ar(y)
=
βΣ0
β2 (Σ0 + σ2 ) + σ
2
u
. (5.34)
Therefore, (5.26) and (5.27) follow from (5.30) and (5.32). Moreover,
E(pi|s) = Σ0
√
σ2u
2(Σ0 + σ2 )
3/2
(s− p0)2.
The ex-ante profit for the insider is given by
E(pi) =
Σ0
√
σ2u
2 (Σ0 + σ2 )
1/2
. (5.35)
The special case with  = 0 will return to the original Kyle’s solution, i.e., λ = 1
2
√
Σ0
σ2u
and β =
√
σ2u
Σ0
. Note that the noisy signal reduces the insider’s profit compared to the
case with  = 0 as we expected. The higher the noise signal (larger σ2 ), the lower the
profit, also the lower the insider’s trading intensity β, since the insider would trade
more cautiously due to his imperfect knowledge about the asset value v.
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5.2.2 The multiple period case
We now turn our attention to the multiple period case. The set up in Kyle’s model
(Section 1) will be followed with a distinction: We assume the informed trader observes
a noisy signal sn = v + ann at the nth auction, where the errors 1, ..., N are iid
N(0, σ2 ) random variables, the sequence {n} is independent of v, and a1, ..., aN are
positive constants that decrease as n→ N . The information set F In−1, as a knowledge
base for the informed trader to determine his strategy ∆xn at the nth action, now
contains {∆x1, ...,∆xn−1; s1, ..., sn}, in addition to the uninformed traders’ information
set FUn−1, which includes {p1, ..., pn−1; ∆y1, ...,∆yn−1}. It makes sense for the informed
trader to base his decision at the nth auction on the difference E(v|s1, ..., sn) − pn−1
since he does not know v. For instance, the strategy ∆xn = βn(s¯n − pn−1) ∆tn may be
chosen with s¯n =
1
n
∑n
i=1 si. However, that would present some technical difficulty in
the derivation of recursive equilibrium solution to this problem. In what follows, the
trading rule ∆xn = βn(sn − pn−1) ∆tn will be adopted which makes it easier to extend
Kyle’s original solution to the current setting.
Theorem 3. There exists a unique linear equilibrium (X,P ), represented as a recursive
linear equilibrium, characterized by (for n = 1, ..., N)
∆xn = βn (sn − pn−1) ∆tn, (5.36)
∆pn = pn − pn−1 = λn∆yn = λn(∆xn + ∆un), (5.37)
E[pin|F In−1] = αn−1 (sn − pn−1)2 + δn−1. (5.38)
Given Σ0, σ
2
u, σ
2
 , the sequences βn, λn, αn, Σn, δn are the unique solutions to difference
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equations
αn−1 =
b2n
4λn (1− αnλn) , where bn =
Σn−1
Σn−1 + a2nσ2
, (5.39)
βn ∆tn =
bn (1− 2αnλn)
2λn (1− αnλn) , (5.40)
λn =
1
βn∆tn
bn
+ σ
2
u
βnΣn−1
=
βnΣn
β2n∆tn (b
−1
n − 1) Σn−1 + σ2u
, (5.41)
Σn = (1− βnλn∆tn) Σn−1, (5.42)
δn−1 = δn + αnλ2n σ
2
u∆tn + αn(1− bn) Σn−1 + αn a2n+1σ2 , (5.43)
subject to the boundary conditions αN = 0, δN = 0 and the second order condition
λn (1− αnλn) > 0. (5.44)
See Apendix for the proof of Theorem 3.
Note: In the special case with  = 0, (5.39) — (5.43) go back to the solutions for the
original Kyle’s difference equations in Theorem 2.
Now we make some additional assumptions and present the following proposition
(also to be proved in Appendix), which is an extension of Proposition 1, and plays an
important role in characterization of the equilibrium solution provided in Theorem 3.
Proposition 3. Assume a
2
nσ
2

Σn−1
≡ c ∈ (0, 1) (constant), hence bn = 11+c , γ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
for
all n = 1, ..., N . We also assume ∆tn = 1/N , ∆ for all n. Given Σ0, σ2 , σ2u and ∆,
let qn = αnλn and consider the cubic equation
8q3n−1 − 8q2n−1 − 2Knqn−1 +Kn = 0 (5.45)
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with n = N,N − 1, ..., 1 moving backwards, where
Kn =
γ4
(1− 2qn) [2(1− qn)− γ(1− 2qn)] . (5.46)
For every n, (5.45) has a unique root qn ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
that is economically meaningful.
Having obtained the sequence {qn}, other parameters can be derived recursively (moving
forwards):
Σn =
[
1− γ(1− 2qn)
2(1− qn)
]
Σn−1, (5.47)
λn =
[
(1− 2qn) γ Σn−1
4(1− qn)2 σ2u∆
]1/2
=
{
(1− 2qn) γ Σn
2(1− qn) [2(1− qn)− γ(1− 2qn)] σ2u∆
}1/2
,(5.48)
βn =
γ(1− 2qn)
2λn (1− qn)∆ , (5.49)
αn−1 =
γ2
4λn (1− qn) . (5.50)
See Apendix for the proof of Proposition 3.
5.3 Simulation study of Kyle’s equilibrium solution
In this section, we carry out simulation studies of equilibrium solution with the help of
new algorithm developed from part [1].
We use σu = 0.5, Σ0 = 0.4, p0 = 2.0 and N = 50. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the
equilibrium solution to model parameters. With all model parameters, we do simulation
on order flows from both insider as well as from the noise traders, trade prices and profit.
The true value of underlying security is assumed to be V = 2.5.
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Figure 5.3: Kyle model parameters, β, λ, α, δ,Σ
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Figure 5.4: Order flows, trade prices and profit
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There are some findings from the solutions to Kyle’s model. For market depth(inverse
of the λ), it is almost constant. Neither increasing nor decreasing market depth is con-
sistent with behavior by the informed trader which is ”stable” enough to sustain an
equilibrium. For the informed trader, the optimal trading strategy β is through gradual
submission, rather than abruptly. When true value revelation becomes close, the in-
formed has no incentive to hide his private information and trade aggressively to benefit
from the last-minute opportunity. The α and δ define the quadratic profit function.
The leftover information Σ diminishes as trading unfolds which is not surprising. The
end of period information left ΣN (N=50 in our case) is non-zero which is determined
dynamically from equilibrium solution.
The order flows and trade price evolution from figure 5.4 are illuminating with fol-
lowing properties: (1).The informed trader is actively disguise his informed orders(∆x)
among the uninformed orders(∆u). (2). Informed orders are larger after negative un-
informed trades. i.e.,Assume informed trader has positive projection, V is greater than
current price p. After a large uninformed buy, the informed sends a small buy order;
whereas, after a large uninformed sell, the informed submits a large buy order.(3).
Informed order size increases over time. As trading unfolds, informed orders become
more aggressive. (4) The volatility of trade prices is determined by the noise traders
but not by the insider. There is a sense in which the ”trading volume” of the insider
is small. Despite his small trading volume, however, the insider ultimately determines
what price is established at the end of trading. He does this because his trades, unlike
the trades of noise traders, are positively correlated from period to period. (5). The
end of trade price would not converge to the true value while trade price moves toward
its value. p50 = 2.43 against true value of 2.5 in this simulation.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic Bayesian Inference
In this chapter, we propose a Bayesian time series model, and carry out simulation
studies. The model is originated from Kyle’s model, and in particular, motivated by the
derivation of Kyle’s equilibrium solution as shown in Proposition 3 from last chapter.
We establish the theoretical framework for Bayesian time series. First we look at
Bayesian approach, since they constitute the foundation of the field; we move on to
Bayesian time series with important properties but also their limitations. We developed
a Bayesian time series model based on ideas originally put forth in market microstruc-
ture models. We then discuss Markov Chain Monto Carlo (MCMC) algorithms with
proposal of different methods. The empirical studies and Bayesian model assessment
will be presented in the next chapter.
Statistical time series analysis using state space models were developed in the 1970-
80’s. Although the model was originally introduced as a method primarily for use
in aerospace-related research, it has been applied to modeling data from economics,
Harvey and Pierse (1984), West and Harrison (1997), Durbin and Koopman (2001).
The impressive growth of applications is largely due to the possibility of solving com-
plicated problems using Monte Carlo methods in a Bayesian framework. A Bayesian
approach has several advantages, both methodological and computational. The time
series models like ARMA can be regarded in terms of state space models. But Bayesian
framework offer more flexibility in treating non-stationary time series, or modeling hi-
erarchical data with structural changes, and are often more easily interpretable. The
more general class of Bayesian models extend the analysis to non-Gaussian and non-
linear dynamic systems. We start with basic notions.
6.1 Basic notions
The Bayesian estimation assumes a T x 1 vector y
.
= (y1, ..., yT )
′ of observations
described through a probability density p(y|θ). The unknown parameter θ is a d-
dimensional vector, where θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd. The difference between the Bayesian and the
classical approach lies in the mathematical nature of θ. In the classical framework,
it is assumed that there exist a true and fixed value for parameter θ. Conversely,
the Bayesian approach consider θ as a random variable which is characterized by a
prior distribution denoted by pi(θ|η), where η is a vector of hyerparameters. Inference
concerning θ is then based on its posterior distributions, given by
p(θ|y, η) = p(y, θ|η)
p(y|η) =
f(y|θ)pi(θ|η)∫
Θ
f(y|u)pi(u|η)du (6.1)
The result of the integral in the denominator is sometimes written as m(y|η), the
marginal distribution of the data y given the value of the hyperparameter η. If η is
known, we often suppress it in the notation and the posterior distributions would be
written as p(θ|y).
If we are unsure as to the proper value for η, the proper Bayesian solution would
be to quantify this uncertainty in a second-stage prior distribution called hyperprior.
Denoting this distribution by h(η), the posterior for θ is now obtained by marginalizing
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over η,
p(θ|y) = p(y, θ)
p(y)
=
∫
p(y, θ, η)dη∫ ∫
p(y, u, η)dηdu
=
∫
f(y|θ)pi(θ|η)h(η)dη∫ ∫
f(y|u)pi(u|η)h(η)dηdu (6.2)
In principle, this is no reason why the hyperprior for η can not itself depend on a
collection of unknown parameters λ, resulting in a generalization of (6.2) featuring a
second-stage prior h(η|λ) and third-stage prior g(λ). This type of specification of a
model over several levels is called Bayesian hierarchical modeling, with each new distri-
bution forming a new level in the hierarchy. This constitutes an important framework
to model structural changes.
The main objective of a statistical analysis is forecasting ; the event of interest is the
value of a future observation y∗. The prediction of a future value y∗ given the data y
is observed by computing the conditional distribution of y∗ given y is called predictive
distribution. It can be written as,
pi(y∗|y) =
∫
f(y∗, θ|y)dθ =
∫
f(y∗|y, θ)p(θ|y)dθ (6.3)
where p(θ|y) is posterior distribution of θ.
6.2 Time series in Bayesian framework
A univariate or multivariate time series is described probabilistically by a sequence of
random variables or vectors (Yn : n = 1, 2, ...), where the index n denotes time. One
basic problem is to make forecasts about the value of the next observation, Yn+1 say,
having observed data up to time n, Y1 = y1, ..., Yn = yn or Y1:n = y1:n for short. If we are
able to specify the joint density pi(y1, ..., yn) for any n >= 1, and Bayesian forecasting
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would be solving by computing the predictive density,
pi(yn+1|y1:n) = pi(y1:n+1)
pi(y1:n)
(6.4)
Suppose θ is the unknown parameter, and a prior pi(θ) on θ, we obtain the joint den-
sity pi(y1:n) =
∫
pi(y1:n|θ)pi(θ)dθ. More importantly, Bayesian time series characterize
some favorable mechanism which are not present from other approaches.
The dependence structure in Bayesian time series is normally assumed to be con-
ditional independence, i.e., Y1, ..., Y2 are conditionally independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d) given parameter θ, θ could have complicated structures, or even time
dependent. pi(y1:n|θ) =
∏n
i=1 pi(yi|θ).
Note that Y1, ..., Yn are only conditionally independent: the observations y1, ..., yn
provides information about the unknown value of θ and, through θ, on the value of
the next observation Yn+1. Thus, Yn+1 depends, in a probabilistic sense, on the past
observations Y1, ..., Yn. The predictive density can be computed as
pi(yn+1|y1:n) =
∫
pi(yn+1, θ|y1:n)dθ
=
∫
pi(yn+1|θ, y1:n)pi(θ|y1:n)dθ
=
∫
pi(yn+1|θ)pi(θ|y1:n)dθ (6.5)
where pi(θ|y1:n) is the posterior density of θ, conditioning on the data y1, ..., yn. As we
can see, the posterior density can be computed via Bayes formula,
pi(θ|y1:n) = pi(y1:n|θ)pi(θ)
pi(y1:n)
∝
n∏
t=1
pi(yt|θ)pi(θ)
Note that the denominator pi(y1:n) is a normalized constant which does not depend on
θ. Therefore, the posterior density could be computed recursively. At time (n− 1), the
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information available about θ is described by conditional density
pi(θ|y1:n−1) ∝
n−1∏
t=1
pi(yt|θ)pi(θ)
This density plays the role of prior when we move to time n. Once the new information
about yn becomes available, we just have to compute the likelihood function, which is
pi(yn|θ, y1:n−1) = pi(yn|θ) by the assumption of conditional independence, and update
the prior pi(y1:n−1) by Bayes rule, obtaining
pi(θ|y1:n−1, yn) ∝ pi(θ|y1:n−1)pi(yn|θ) ∝
n−1∏
t=1
pi(yt|θ)pi(θ)pi(yn|θ)
This recursive structure is critical in time series analysis. In contrast to non-Bayesian
time series approaches, Bayesian analysis offers more flexibility and requires no model
fitting with all past and current information due to the fact the past information has
all been incorporated in its conditional densities. We ”update” density functions with
newly available information.
6.3 Dynamic Bayesian Model
We develop a Dynamic Bayesian Factor Model (DBFM) which incorporates multi-
variate dynamic factors, and time-varying patterns that arise from the microstructure
settings. The DBFM, in basic form, models dynamic multivariate factors such as eco-
nomic conditions, hierarchical structures, common time-varying component in multiple
time series etc; in its advanced form, it models time-varying volatilities like stochastic
volatility (SV) or ARCH/GARCH.
The dynamic factor model is an extension to dynamic linear model. There has been
an increasing interest in the application of dynamic linear model (henceforth DLM),
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or state space models in time series analysis. They allow a natural interpretation
of a time series as the combination of several components, such as trend, regressive
or volatility components. At the same time, the computation can be implemented
by recursive algorithms. The problems of estimation and forecasting are solved by
recursively computing the conditional distribution of the quantities of interest, given
the available information. Such desirable features are quite naturally treated in a
Bayesian framework.
Dynamic factor models can be used to model univariate or multivariate time series,
also in the presence of non-stationary, structural changes, and irregular patterns.
We present the DLM in its generalized matrix notation.
Definition 5. The dynamic linear model, in its basic form, employs the following
relationship,
Yt = F
′
tθt + νt νt ∼ N [0, Vt] (6.6)
θt = Gtθt−1 + ωt ωt ∼ N [0,Wt] (6.7)
(θ0|D0) ∼ N [m0, c0] (6.8)
where νt and ωt are independent. m0 and c0 are some prior moments.
Denote Yt a (r x 1) vector of observations on the time series over time t = 1, 2, ...n.
Ft is a known (n x r) matrix for regression. Gt is a known (n x n) matrix for state space
evolution. Vt is a (r x r) matrix, and Wt is a (n x n) matrix for variance-covariance.
Equation (6.6) is called observation equation, which defines sampling distribution
for Yt conditional on θt. Given θt, Yt is independent of all other observations and states.
F ′tθt is the mean response, and νt is the observation error.
Equation (6.7) is called system, or evolution equation, which defines the time evo-
lution of the state vector. The conditional independence structure of state space shows
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that, given θt−1 and the known value of Gt and Wt, the conditional distribution of θt
is fully independent of Yt−1. The system error is ωt.
Consider a univariate DLM model that is closed to external information at time
t ≥ 1, such that given initial prior information D0 at t = 0, at any future time t, the
available information set is Dt = {Yt, Dt−1}, where Yt is the observed value at time t.
At any time t, for all k ≥ 0, define,
at(k) = E(θt+k|y1:t) (6.9)
Rt(k) = V ar(θt+k|y1:t) (6.10)
ft(k) = E(Yt+k|y1:t) = E[F ′t+kθt+k|y1:t], (6.11)
Qt(k) = V ar(Yt+k|y1:t) (6.12)
The Forecast Function is ft(k). For k strictly greater than 0, the forecast function
provides the expected values of future observations given current information.
ft(k) = E[Yt+k|Dt] for all k ≥ 1 (6.13)
Our model is a fully dynamic multivariate factors representation of market mi-
crostructure models by the integration of microstructure settings from Kyle’s frame-
work.
6.4 The Model
We continue the derivation from previous chapter, and present formal definitions of our
time series model.
Consider an asset that pays off, v ∼ N(p0,Σ0), p0 is the expected value, and Σ0
is the value uncertainty at the beginning of the trade. There are multiple trading
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periods, with n = 1, ..., N , and t = 0, ..., 1. The quantity traded by noise traders is
denoted by ∆un, where ∆un ∼ N(0, σ2u∆tn). The informed trader observes true value
v. The informed trader maximizes his expected profit by choosing optimal trading
strategy ∆xn. It is assumed that v, ∆un are all independent. There are competitive
risk-neutral market-makers, who set the prices of asset equal to the expected value of
the liquidation values conditional on the information about the quantities traded by
the strategic insider trader and noise traders, ∆yn = ∆xn + ∆un. We also assume
∆tn = 1/N for all n. The model is specified as follows,
order flows : ∆yn = βn (v − pn−1) ∆tn + ∆un, (6.14)
βn = βn−1 + µn−1 + ∂βn (6.15)
µn = µn−1 + ∂µn (6.16)
∆un ∼ N(0, σ2u ∆tn) (6.17)
∂βn ∼ N(0, σ2β) (6.18)
∂µn ∼ N(0, σ2µ) (6.19)
price : ∆pn = pn − pn−1 = λn ∆yn + n (6.20)
λn = λn−1 + ∂λn (6.21)
n ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (6.22)
∂λn ∼ N(0, σ2φ) (6.23)
where βn, µn and λn are dynamic components, ∂βn, ∂µn and ∂λn are stochastic terms
which are assumed to be uncorrelated. In our model, µn has the interpretation of
incremental growth in the level of the series over the time interval n− 1 to n, evolving
during that interval according to the addition of the stochastic element ∂µn. The level
βn at time n evolves systematically via the addition of the growth µn and undergoes a
67
further stochastic shift via the addition of ∂βt.
The state vector is defined as θn = (βn, µn)
′, n = 1, ..., N . Denoting mn−1 =
(βˆn−1, µˆn−1)′, where βˆn−1 and µˆn−1 are estimates at time n − 1. The one-step ahead
state estimates and point forecasts are given by,
an = Gnmn−1 =
βˆn−1 + µˆn−1
µˆn−1
 (6.24)
fn = Fnan = (βˆn−1 + µˆn−1)(v − pn−1)∆tn (6.25)
The kth-period ahead state forecast is:
an(k) = (βˆn + k µˆn) (6.26)
which is a linear function of k.
The model is always observable, since the observability matrix is always full-rank,
with Ω:
Ω =
1 1
0 1
 (6.27)
Therefore, given σµ > 0, there exist limiting values for Rn, Cn, and An (see West and
Harrison; 1997). In particular, the gain An converges to a constant matrix A = (A1 A2)
′
(Theorem 7.2).
Given the existence of limiting values, we obtain the asymptotic properties of up-
dating equations. Writing en = Yn − fn, the updating equations in terms of limiting
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values:
Yn = (βˆn−1 + µˆn−1)(v − pn−1)∆t+ en (6.28)
βˆn = βˆn−1 + µˆn−1 + A1 en (6.29)
µˆn = µˆn−1 + A2 en (6.30)
With a limiting second difference equation
Yn − 2Yn−1 + Yn−2 = en − φ1en−1 + φ2en−2 (6.31)
where
φ1 = 2− A1 − A2 (6.32)
φ2 = 1− A1 (6.33)
This can be written in terms of backshift operator B as
(1−B)2Yn = (1− φ1B + φ2B2)en (6.34)
There are a number of point prediction methods which take the form of equation (6.31).
Such methods include Box and Jenkins’ predictor, Exponential weighted regression, and
Holt’s liner methods. Our inference employs Bayesian MCMC methods.
6.5 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
In Bayesian analysis, two types of strategies are used in the summarization of the
posterior distributions. If the sampling density has a familiar functional form, such as
a member of an exponential family, and a conjugate prior is chosen for the parameter,
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then the posterior distribution is often expressed in terms of conjugate probability
distributions. In this case, conjugate priors permit posterior densities to emerge without
numerical integration. However, the easy calculations of this specification comes with
a price due to the restrictions they impose on the form of the prior. A second type of
computation strategy is called simulation-based methods. In many cases, it is unlikely
that the conjugate prior is an adequate representation of the prior state of knowledge,
and the posterior distribution is not a familiar functional form. In such cases, the
asymptotic approximations or Monte Carlo methods are required.
In terms of simulation-based methods, rejection sampling with a suitable choice
of proposal density is a general method for simulating from an arbitrary posterior
distribution. Importance sampling and sampling importance re-sampling (SIR) are
alternative methods for computing integrals and simulating from a general posterior
distribution. The SIR algorithm is especially useful when one wishes to integrate the
sensitivity of a posterior distribution with respect to changes in the prior and likelihood
functions.
Monte Carlo integration and posterior approximation via rejection sampling or im-
portance sampling involve direct simulation from an sampling distribution, usually
viewed as an approximation to the true density p(X). However, when the dimension
of the model becomes large, both rejection sampling and importance sampling can be
difficult to setup because they require the construction of a suitable proposal density.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm becomes the only way to approximate
the posterior density in high-dimensional problems. The idea of MCMC sampling was
first introduced by Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Teller (1953) and was subsequently gener-
alized by Hasting (1970). A general and detailed statistical theory of MCMC methods
can be found in Tierney (1994).
The MCMC sampling strategy relies on the construction of a Markov chain with
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realizations θ[0], θ[1], ..., θ[j], ... in the parameter space Θ. Under appropriate regularity
conditions (see Tierney 1994), asymptotic results guarantee that as j tends to infinity,
then θ[j] converge in distribution to p(θ|y). Hence, the realized values of the chain can
be used to make inference about the joint posterior. All we required are algorithms to
construct the chains.
We first introduce Gibbs sampler algorithm, and then present the MCMC analysis
on two Bayesian models: the original Kyle’s model, and our dynamic model. Our
simulation studies are based on the new algorithms we developed from the previous
chapter.
6.5.1 The Gibbs sampler
The Gibbs sampler is an algorithm based on successful generations from the full condi-
tional densities. An elementary exploration can be found in Casella and George (1992).
See also Gelfand and Smith (1990), Tanner and Wong (1987). The full condition den-
sity p(θi|θ6=i, y) is the posterior density of the ith element of parameter θ .= (θ1, ..., θd)′,
d is the total dimension of parameter θ, given all other elements, where elements of θ
can be scalars or sub-vectors. The Gibbs algorithm works as follows:
1. Initialize the iteration counter of the chain to j = 1 and
set the initial value θ[0]
.
= (θ
[0]
1 , ...θ
[0]
d )
′
2. Generate a new value θ[j] from θ[j−1] through successive
generation values:
θ
[j]
1 ∼ p(θ1|θ[j−1]6=1 , y)
θ
[j]
2 ∼ p(θ2|θ[j]1 , θ[j−1]3 , ..., θ[j−1]d , y)
...
θ
[j]
d ∼ p(θd|θ[j]6=d, y)
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3. Change counter j to j + 1 and go back to step 2 until
convergence is reached.
As the number of iterations increases, the chain approaches its stationary distribu-
tion and convergence is then assumed to hold approximately (Tierney 1994). Sufficient
conditions for the convergence of the Gibbs sampler are given in Roberts and Smith
(1994). As noted in Chib and Greenberg (1996), these conditions ensure that each full
conditional density is well defined and that the support of the joint posterior is not sep-
arated into disjoint regions since this would prevent exploration of the full parameter
space.
The Gibbs sampler is most frequently used MCMC sampling strategy when it is easy
to write down full conditional densities from which we could generate draws. When
the expression p(θi|θ6=i, y) has no functional form, we might consider reject methods
(Ripley 1987), the Giddy-Gibbs sampler when θi is univariate (Ritter and Tanner 1982),
adaptive rejection sampling (Gilks and Wild 1992) or Metroplis-Hasting Algorithm.
6.5.2 MCMC for original Kyle’s model
The original Kyle’s model has exact solutions to a set of difference equations. We
derived new methods of solving these difference equations which boils down to solving
just one cubic equation on {dn} sequence, where dn = αnλn.
The parameter sequence {dn} depend on the choice of N , the number of periods,
and independent on all other parameters. Given {dn} values, we could solve all other
parameters exactly once for all instead of recursive approximation. Consequently, we
only requires two priors for original Kyle’s model.
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Original Kyle’s model can be written as:
∆un ∼ N(0, σ2u∆tn), (6.35)
∆yn = βn (v − pn−1) ∆tn + ∆un, (6.36)
pn = pn−1 + λn(∆xn + ∆un), (6.37)
Σn = V ar(v|FUn ), (6.38)
where ∆tn =
1
N
, ∀ n = 1, ..., N.
In order to write the posterior likelihood function, we define ψ
.
= (Σ0, σ
2
u). And vec-
tors Yn
.
= (∆y1,∆y2, ...,∆yn)
′, and Xn
.
= {(v− p0)∆t1, (v− p1)∆t2, ..., (v− pn−1)∆tn}′.
Xn and Yn are observed information at time n. Given the initial prior informa-
tion D0 at time t = 0, at any future time, the available information set is thus
Dn = {Dn−1, Xn, Yn}.
Define Θn = (θ0, θ1, ...θn), which includes all latent variables, in our case, θ
.
=
{λ, β, α, δ}. The conditional posterior function of ψ can be expressed as follows:
p(ψ|Θn, Dn) = p(Σ0|Θn, Dn)p(σ2u|Θn, Dn) (6.39)
this implies the independence between two priors.
The likelihood function,
`(σ2u|Θn, Dn) ∝ p(σ2u|D0)(σu)−n exp
[
− n
2σ2u
(Y −Xβ)′(Y −Xβ)
]
(6.40)
We propose the following priors on the parameters Σ0 and σ
2
u of the preceding
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model:
σ2u ∼ IG(α, β) (6.41)
Σ0 ∼ N(µ, σ2)I{Σ0>0} (6.42)
where α, β, µ, σ2 are hyperparameters, I{.} is the indicate function which equals unity if
the constraints holds and zero otherwise. The prior σ2u has inverted gamma distribution,
while Σ0 has improper prior distribution since Σ0 follows exact equilibrium solutions
given the available information set. And p(ψ) = p(σ2u)p(Σ0).
Then we construct the joint posterior densities:
p(ψ|Θn, Dn) ∝ `(ψ|Θn, Dn)p(ψ) (6.43)
6.5.3 MCMC for our dynamic Bayesian model
In this subsection, we provide derivations of MCMC via our dynamic model. Our
proposed model provides more insights about market behaviors when we carry out
empirical studies in the next chapter.
The state vector for period n is defined as
θn = (βn, µn)
′ (6.44)
where n = 1, ..., N . Write Θn = {θ0, θ1, ...θn} for all n state vectors. This is sometimes
called latent variable.
We obtain,
∆un ∼ N(0, V ), (6.45)
ωn
.
= (∂βn, ∂µn)
′ ∼ N(0,W ) (6.46)
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Where V = σ2u∆tn, and W is the variance-covariance matrix of vector (∂βn, ∂µn)
′. Both
V and W are constant and independent over time n. Define model parameters,
ψ = {V,W} (6.47)
We also define the information set at time n asDn. Let vectors Yn
.
= (∆y1,∆y2, ...,∆yn)
′,
and Xn
.
= {(v − p0)∆t1, (v − p1)∆t2, ..., (v − pn−1)∆tn}′. Xn and Yn are observed data
at time n. Given the initial prior information D0 = θ0 at time t = 0, at any future
time, the available information set is thus Dn = {Dn−1, Xn, Yn}.
This structure is evident in considering MCMC based on Gibbs sampling. Gibbs
sampling suggests the full posterior distribution:
p(Θn, ψ|Dn) (6.48)
may be simulated by iterating between two conditional posteriors
p(Θn|ψ,Dn)↔ p(ψ|Θn, Dn) (6.49)
Note that this procedure is different from original Gibbs sampling. This involves sam-
pling Θn, and separately ψ, from their full, multivariate conditional posteriors, rather
than sequencing through individual scalar elements as in the original definition of Gibbs
sampling.
Gibbs sampling procedure:
1. Simulating p(Θn|ψ,Dn)
This procedure is standard. Based on the observation that the analysis is con-
ditioning on ψ, simulation of LHS of (6.49) will be accessible as a multivariate
normal distribution.
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2. Simulating p(ψ|Θn, Dn)
This procedure depends on the model form, we will illustrate in details.
3. Repeat these steps until convergence
In our proposed model, the conditional posterior for ψ is
p(ψ|Θn, Dn) = p(V |Θn, Dn)p(W |Θn, Dn) (6.50)
We assume prior independence between parameter V and W .
It can be shown that, the posterior likelihood function for V is:
`(V |Θn, Dn) ∝ p(V |D0)(V )−n/2 exp
[
− n
2V
(Y −Xβ)′(Y −Xβ)
]
(6.51)
and the posterior likelihood function for W ,
`(W |Θn, Dn) ∝ p(W |D0)|W |−n/2 exp
[
−n
2
trace(WˆnW
−1)
]
(6.52)
where ωn = θn −Gtθn−1 = (ωn,1, ωn,2)′ for each n, and Wˆn = n−1
∑n
t=1 ωtω
′
t.
We propose the following priors on the parameters ψ = {V,W} andW =
W1 0
0 W2
:
V ∼ IG(a1, b1) (6.53)
W1 ∼ IG(a2, b2) (6.54)
W2 ∼ IG(a3, b3) (6.55)
where a{.}, b{.} are hyperparameters. V , W1 and W2 have inverted gamma distributions.
And p(ψ) = p(V )p(W ).
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Then we obtain the joint posterior density:
p(ψ|Θn, Dn) ∝ `(ψ|Θn, Dn)p(ψ) (6.56)
6.6 Simulation
It is instructive to compare our dynamic models through simulation studies. The target
data set is generated from original Kyle’s model. Two simulations are carried out on
the target data set: one is Bayesian MCMC for our dynamic model, another is MCMC
for original Kyle’s model.
Recall that the original Kyle’s model only depends on two parameters, we first
assume σu = 0.5, Σ0 = 0.4, N = 50, and obtain sequences of all parameters {λn, αn,
βn, Σn, δn} for n = 1, ..., N . Then we take market initial condition at p0, and simulate
the market prices sequence and order imbalance. The order flow sequence consists of
aggregated order flows from both the informed trader as well as the uninformed.
Suppose we know the market information i.e., the market price evolution and the
aggregated order imbalance, that represent what may be observed in a real market
situation. And all model parameters are unknown, we then perform MCMC simulations
and infer on model unknowns.
Given the price sequence {pn}, and net order flow sequence {∆yn}, with n = 1, ..., N ,
we run Bayesian MCMC for our proposed model.
In table 6.1, our model has the estimate of posterior mean of σ2u = 0.27315 which is
close to the true value σ2u = 0.25. The deviance information (DIC = -115.6) suggests
good fit (details about Bayesian model selection will be discussed in the next chapter).
Figure 6.1 shows MCMC method for our dynamic modeling picks up the trend well;
the turning point is near n = 42 which is consistent with actual data. Figure 6.2
presents Bayesian results for λn. The posterior mean of λn is flat throughout and
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Figure 6.1: Insiders’ strategy, original vs. MCMC for our model
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Figure 6.2: Reciprocal of market depth, original vs. MCMC for our model
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Table 6.1: Parameters and Deviance Bayesian results
Parameters Mean SD
σ2u 0.27315 0.095075
σ2β 0.06745 0.122625
σ2µ 0.03597 0.053575
σ2 0.00005 3.461E-7
σ2φ 0.00050 0.000019
deviance -115.50 0.12940
drop at the end of trading periods as we expect. We notice that the variance term
σ2 has fairly small mean 0.00005 and small variance which represents the stochastic
term of price equation. This is true since this is how we construct the dataset initially.
The data generated from original Kyle’s model does not carry stochastic term, the
price evolution is proportion to total order imbalance with the price set by the market
market. The Bayesian results reflect the relationship well with minor stochastic terms.
This assumption may be further investigated when we do empirical studies using real
market data set. Figure 6.3 shows results of order flows from our dynamic model. The
insider is actively hide his position among noise order flows while he is trading in the
direction of his own knowledge.
We then illustrate details of our Bayesian MCMC analysis.
Figure 6.4 displays trace plots of the simulated draws of variance component. Note
that we have 6000 iterations with first half burn-in. The simulated draws appear to
have reached the main support of the posterior of variance component.
Figure 6.5 shows density plots of parameters. They all have single modal shape
which suggest good support for the posterior mean.
One can observe the autocorrelation structure of the sequences by using autocorre-
lation plots produced in Figure 6.6. The autocorrelations are very close to one for lag
one and reduce quickly as a function of the lag.
In the second simulation, we perform MCMC method for original Kyle’s model, i.e.,
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Figure 6.3: Bayesian results of order flows
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Figure 6.4: Parameter and deviance trace plots
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MCMC using two-variable Kyle’s model on the same data set we created. The posterior
mean for σu is 0.5002 vs. actual value of 0.5, and the posterior mean for Σ0 is 0.3402
vs. true value 0.4. The Bayesian methods provide robust and consistent results in our
simulation studies. Since there are only two unknown variables, the model performs
well if we can infer on those two variables successfully, and other parameters are derived
accordingly. The βn series shown in Figure 6.7 is at no surprise.
Table 6.2: Parameters and Deviance Bayesian results via original Kyle’s model
Parameters Mean SD True value
Σ0 0.3402 0.02768 0.4
σu 0.5002 0.0021 0.5
deviance -114.510 0.07764
Figure 6.7: MCMC Estimates of beta via original Kyle’s model vs. actual beta
84
Chapter 7
Empirical studies and Bayesian
model selection
In previous chapters, we derived our dynamic model and validated through simula-
tion studies, we turn to applications of the model in real market condition. First, we
set up our target data. Secondly, we compare dynamic model vs. original kyle’s model.
We do model inference on different length of real market data in the third section. The
empirical results on different stocks and various periods will be discussed in the fourth
section. Finally, we summarize Bayesian model diagnosis on different models.
7.1 Data
We study the informed trading prior to the corporate earning release which took place
every quarter on NYSE stocks. The intraday, transaction-level data are collected from
trade and quote (TAQ) database. The size of intraday data set is enormous because it
contains all trades and quotes per second. The daily time frame is regular trading hours
from 9:30AM to 4:00PM. Corresponding daily data come from CRSP and quarterly
earning data are from COMPUSTAT database. Since every stock has its own earning
announcement date and varies by calendar year, we have separate treatment to adjust
different quarterly earning periods (start, end, and number of trading periods) even for
the same stock.
All trade data are matched against quote database to find the corresponding quote
information. The intra-day data are aggregated to small intervals, in our case, 30
minutes. We use the algorithm mentioned in chapter 3. All trades are translated to
signed order imbalance.
The data set are aggregated to different number of periods with observed market
information. To study the model performance on the size of data set, we have different
length of periods on the same data set. For example, the whole period should span a
quarter of high frequency data, which is roughly three-month data depending on two
consecutive earning release dates. We also take a subset of the whole data set, for
instance, the last one-month data to study the behavior of the model since the original
model would expect more intensive activity at the end of trading periods, this is the
spirit of original model. We would like to explore the robustness of our dynamic model
under various trading periods.
We randomly choose 5 NYSE stocks on four different earning announcement peri-
ods. The four sampled periods are: 2003Q4, 2005Q2, 2006Q3 and 2008Q3, that cover
sample periods from both boom periods like from year 2003, 2005 and stressed economic
environment like from year 2008, that is what we have experienced most recently.
7.2 Dynamic Model vs. original Kyle’s Model
We take one NYSE stock, ticker IBM, and study one sample period at 3rd quarter of
calendar year 2008. The quarterly data for IBM 2008Q3 consists of roughly three-month
intraday data.
Figure 7.1 illustrates dynamic model results for the insider’s strategy. It is relatively
smooth at the beginning of that period, and starts to trade aggressively at period
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n = 565 which is around Oct,2 2008. We further look at the trade price evolution
during that period and check if there is any irregular pattern. From Figure 7.2, we
do not see disconnectivity during the whole 3-month period. The price data exhibits
rather smooth pattern while the insiders’ strategy has steep slope toward the end of
trading periods. The result shows that, the dynamic model produces some information
about insiders’ strategy which may not be observed or derived by price evolution alone.
We observe our dynamic model performs well under both positive and negative true
value position, i.e., the true value (which is known to the insider) is higher (or lower)
than the prevailing market prices. In this example, the insider has negative true value
projection, i.e., his knowledge about the true value is lower than market prices, and he
should take the short position. The model inference confirms that the insider’s strategy
is still positive and grow aggressively (short more) over the time.
Figure 7.1: Insiders’ strategy, MCMC for dynamic model on IBM 2008Q3
We also calculate order flows from our dynamic model. Figure 7.3 illustrates the
insider is actively hiding his position among the order flows from noise traders, and he
trades more aggressively toward the end of trading periods. Notice that order flows are
negative for the insider which means ”sell” positions since he is trading in the direction
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Figure 7.2: Trade prices on IBM prior to 2008Q3 earning announcement
Figure 7.3: Order flows, MCMC for our model on IBM 2008Q3
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of his knowledge, in this case an unfavorable true value.
Figure 7.4 shows MCMC results of the reciprocal of market depth, i.e., λn sequence.
The λn sequence is little jumpy from the model inference which means the market depth
could be noisy on the high frequency data. This parameter reflects the actual market
condition that may vary rapidly across the time, such market conditions include macro
economic condition, correlation with other industry stocks etc. If we take a further
look at the data, we may still discover that the λn sequence drops at the end of trading
periods.
Figure 7.4: Reciprocal of market depth, MCMC for our model on IBM 2005Q2
We then run Bayesian MCMC for original Kyle’s model. The parameter results are
shown in Table 7.1. The original Kyle’s model has deviance of 2324.019.
We present the Bayesian MCMC results for βn and λn using original Kyle’s model
in Figure 7.5 and 7.6. Since the original model is fully determined by two parameters
and number of periods, the upward slope are close to the end of trading periods, in
this case, takes place in the last day of trading periods (Oct, 16 2008) before earning
announcement. We notice the same pattern as simulated data of Kyle’s model.
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Figure 7.5: Beta, MCMC for original Kyle’s model on IBM 2008Q3
Figure 7.6: Lambda, MCMC for original Kyle’s model on IBM 2008Q3
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Table 7.1: Parameters and Deviance results via original Kyle’s model on IBM 2008Q3
Parameters Mean SD
Σ0 0.567 0.07693
σu 33.636 0.02558
deviance 2324.019 0.06774
7.3 Model fitting with different sample periods
In this section, we compare model performance on various length of periods. In real
market condition, we may observe portion of the data set, like one-month of the data
close to the earning release, or we may want to explore using subset of the data. The
spirit of the original kyle’s model is the insider would trade more intensively at the end
of the trading periods.
In the first analysis, we observe only last month data for IBM 2008Q3 without
knowing what happened in the first two months. And we run Bayesian MCMC for our
dynamic model. We observe exactly same pattern as with three-month data, see figure
7.7. The left figure shows results for complete quarter data while the right figure shows
only last-month data are applied via Bayesian methods. We then take derivative of
estimates and get m = 1 at n = 591 for quarterly and n = 151 for monthly, the first
one happens on Oct 2, 2008, 11:30AM, the second one is on Oct 2, 2008, 12:00PM,
they are right on with each other.
Table 7.2: MCMC for original Kyle’s model using different length of data
Parameters Mean1Qtr SD1Qtr Mean1Mo SD1Mo
Σ0 0.567 0.07693 0.474 0.06802
σu 33.636 0.02558 14.711 0.01929
deviance 2324.019 0.06774 730.34 0.06901
We then perform Bayesian MCMC for original Kyle’s model on the same data sets.
Table 7.2 shows the result of MCMC for original Kyle’s model using one quarter and
one month separately. In Figure 7.8, the corresponding insider strategies are plotted
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Figure 7.7: MCMC for dynamic model using different length of data
over different periods. We get derivative m = 1 at n = 682 and n = 277 respectively,
which is 11:30AM on Oct, 15 2008 and 10:30AM on Oct, 16 2008. They have one-day
gap.
Figure 7.8: MCMC for original Kyle’s model using different length of data
We did exercises on other sample periods, and on other stocks, the conclusion
remains unchanged. The Bayesian dynamic models provide robust results in terms of
various length of periods.
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7.4 Sample stocks
We choose 5 randomly sampled stocks on four different periods. The four sampled
periods are: 2003Q4, 2005Q2, 2006Q3 and 2008Q3. Each period span the whole period
of time between two consecutive earning announcement dates, which is approximately
three months. The sampled periods are chosen from favorable economic environment
as well as stress environment.
Figure 7.9-7.13 illustrate 5 stocks on four different periods. The overall trend of
βn is increasing as we expected, while the insiders take different approaches to execute
their strategies.
Figure 7.9: Results of IBM through four different periods
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Figure 7.10: Results of BA through four different periods
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Figure 7.11: Results of FUN through four different periods
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Figure 7.12: Results of LUK through four different periods
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Figure 7.13: Results of RGR through four different periods
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7.5 Bayesian model selection
We provide model selection on three models: Kyle’s two-variable model, dynamic model
and GARCH(1,1) Bayesian model. The selection method is based on DIC and PLC
and we developed methods to calculate those metrics. The modified GARCH (1,1)
Bayesian model has advantage over the other two models in terms of model selection.
1 The DIC criteria
Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) propose a generalization of the AIC, whose asymptotic
justification is not appropriate for hierarchical (3 or more level) models. The general-
ization is based on the posterior distribution of the deviance statistic,
D(θ) = −2 log f(y|θ) + 2 log h(y), (7.1)
where f(y|θ) is the likelihood function and h(y) is some standardizing function of the
data. These authors suggest summarizing the fit of a model by the posterior expectation
of the deviance, D = Eθ|y[D] and the complexity of a model by the effective number
of parameters pD. In the case of Gaussian models, one can show that a reasonable
definition of pD is the expected deviance minus the deviance evaluated at the posterior
expectations.
pD = Eθ|y[D]−D(Eθ|y[θ]) = D −D(θ), (7.2)
The Deviance Information Criterion(DIC) is then defined as
DIC = D + pD = 2D −D(θ), (7.3)
with smaller values of DIC indicating a better-fitting model. Both building blocks of
DIC and pD, Eθ|y[D], D(Eθ|y[θ]) are estimated via MCMC methods.
DIC is remarkably general, and computed as part of an MCMC run without any need
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for extra sampling, or complicated loss function determination. Moreover, experience
with DIC to date suggests it works remarkably well, despite the fact that no formal
justification for it is yet available outside of posteriors that can be well approximated
by a Gaussian distribution. Still, DIC is by no means universally accepted by Bayesians
as a suitable model choice tool.
Since model comparison using DIC is not invariant to parametrization, the most
sensible parametrization must be carefully chosen beforehand. Unknown scale param-
eters and other restructuring of the model can also lead to subtle changes in the DIC
value.
Finally, DIC will depend on what part of the model specification is considered to
be part of the likelihood, and what is not. Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) refer to this as
the focus issue, i.e., determining which parameters are of primary interest, and which
should count in pD.
Our bayesian MCMC kyle inference has hierarchical parametrization, and DIC are
sensitive to the scale and choice of parameter space.
2 Posterior predictive loss criteria
Another approach is also implemented from the output from posterior simulation is
the posterior predictive loss approach of Gelfand and Ghosh (1998). The PLC is based
on the posterior predictive distributions, and hence, irrespective of the dimensions of
the parameter space, it can be used to compare different models.
We define yl,obs, l = 1, ..., n as observed data, and yl,pred, l = 1, ..., n as prediction.
The selected model are those perform well under balanced loss function: this loss func-
tion penalizes actions both for departure from the corresponding observed value ”fit” as
well as for departure from what we expect the prediction to be ”smoothness”. The loss
puts weights k and 1 on these two components, respectively, to allow for adjustment of
relative regret for the two types of departure.
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For squared loss, the resulting criterion becomes:
Dk =
k
k + 1
G+ P, (7.4)
where G =
∑n
l=1(µl − yl,obs)2, and P =
∑n
l=1 σ
2
l . µl, and σ
2
l are the mean and variance
of the predictive distribution of yl,pred given the observed data yl,obs.
The components of Dk have natural interpretations. G is a goodness-of-fit term,
while P is a penalty term. To clarify, we are seeking to penalize complexity and reward
parsimony, just as DIC and other penalized likelihood criteria do. For a poor model
we expect large predictive variance and poor fit. As the model improves, we expect to
do better on both terms. But as we start to overfit, we will continue to do better with
regard to goodness of fit, but also begin to inflate the variance.
If under model m we have parameters θ(m), then,
p(yl,pred|y) =
∫
p(yl,pred|θ(m))p(θ(m)|y)dθ(m), (7.5)
Hence each posterior realization (say, θ∗) can be used to draw a corresponding yl,pred
from p(yl,pred|θ(m) = θ∗). The resulting y∗l,pred has marginal distribution p(yl,pred|y).
With samples from this distribution we can obtain µl and σ
2
l .
3 Model assessment
We fit three different models and calculate DIC and PLC on different sample periods.
The DIC numbers have marginal difference since DIC is sensitive to parameter spaces
while PLC provides better assessment. The GARCH(1,1) Bayesian model has the
lowest DIC and PLC, our dynamic model ranks the second. The original Kyle’s model
has the worst goodness-of-fit in terms of DIC and PLC. Table 7.3 illustrates the model
assessment for sample period of IBM 2001Q2.
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Table 7.3: Model assessment by different criteria
Model DIC PLC
Original Kyle’s mode 839.60 4062.955
Dynamic model 821.00 3485.356
GARCH(1,1) dynamic model 820.20 2094.378
101
Chapter 8
Other Topics
Two models with asymmetric information, among others, have occupied arguably
the most significant stage in the development of market microstructure research. They
complement each other in a couple of aspects. The sequential trade model represented
by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), referred to as G-M model in what follows, incorporates
the trade orders (buy and sell) and the related bid-ask spread explicitly, but omits the
aspects of trading time and volume. On the other hand, the strategic trade model
introduced by Kyle (1985) articulates the informed trader’s trading strategy in terms
of trading time and volume, but does not separate buy and sell trading orders, hence
there is no bid-ask spread included in the model.
A major task in our research is to perform model-based empirical studies in the
area of market microstructure, especially using high frequency intra-day data. The G-
M model appears to be oversimplified, i.e., the assumptions of several Bernouli variables
in the G-M settings makes it inconvenient to be related to TAQ data. Although we have
extended G-M model in two ways, the modified G-M settings are still not appropriate
for empirical studies. We illustrate the major research we conducted.
Kyle’s model (and the extensions we study) incorporates informational asymmetry
in the informed trader’s strategy and it also quantifies the market liquidity by using
{λn}. Since it uses batch orders instead of limit orders, it does not model transaction
costs directly which is another important factor in market microstructure. Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) proposes a limit order model (G-M model), and Back and Baruch
(2004) provides a unified view on Kyle’s model and the G-M model. A further research
topic for us down the road will concern empirical studies related to the G-M model and
the work of Back and Baruch (2004).
1: The first extension of G-M model
G-M studies a discrete time series. At each time epoch, not only the order buy
or sell is a binary variable, but also the possible value for an asset is assumed to be
either Vl (low) or Vh (high). Such simplification makes it inconvenient to connect G-M
with Kyle’s model in which both the security value and trading volume follow normal
distributions. More importantly, making the security value a continuous variable will
pave a road for empirical studies.
In what follows, we propose a modified G-M setting using interchangeable (or ex-
changeable) sequences in probability. In fact, G-M model is a special application of
interchangeability. Recall that random variables X1, ..., Xn are said to be interchange-
able if their joint distribution is invariant under permutations. A sequence of random
variables X = {Xn, n = 1, 2, ...} is said to be interchangeable if every finite subset of
X is interchangeable. A useful example of X is a mixture of iid random variable that
we are to define. See Chow and Teicher (2003) or other probability books for more
detailed discussion on interchangeability.
• Let µ ∈ (0, 1) represent the proportion of informed traders. Assume one trading
order is processed per unit time.
• At time 0, let the security value be a normal random variable V0 ∼ N(p0,Σ0) whose
density is denoted by f0(·).
• Generate a sample V0 = v from f0(·). Define the conditional probability for an
103
informed trader to place a buy order when observing v by an inverse logit trans-
formation,
PI1(B|v) = 1−PI1(S|v) = e
βv
1 + eβv
with the symbols B = “buy” and S = “sell”,
, β is the coefficient. While for an uninformed (noise) trader,
PU1(B|v) = 1− PU1(S|v) = 1
2
, ∀v
i.e. overall, noise traders are insensitive to a particular asset value when they
decide whether to buy or sell. Overall, we have
P1(B|v) = 1− P1(S|v) = µPI1(B|v) + (1− µ)PU1(B|v). (8.1)
• The unconditional probability of the trading order is given by
P1(B) = 1− P1(S) = µ
∫ ∞
−∞
eβv
1 + eβv
f0(v) dv +
1− µ
2
.
= K1. (8.2)
• The posterior density of the security value V1 after one trade resulted from a buy
order will follow from Bayes’ formula:
f1(v|B) = f0(v) P1(B|v)/P1(B) = 1
K1
f0(v) [µ
eβv
1 + eβv
+
1− µ
2
], (8.3)
and similarly,
f1(v|S) = f0(v) P1(S|v)/P1(S) = 1
(1−K1)f0(v) [µ
1
1 + eβv
+
1− µ
2
], (8.4)
Note that these two conditional densities are different from the unconditional
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density of V1. Moreover, the bid price, ask price and bid-ask spread can be
defined respectively by
B1 = E(V1|S) with respect to the density f1(v|S)
A1 = E(V1|B) with respect to the density f1(v|B)
and A1 −B1.
• To move forward with the evolution of more orders, let On denote the order vari-
able associated with the nth trade taking a value “B” or “S”, and Vn be the
asset value after the nth trade. Assume On, n = 1, 2, ... are conditionally iid
Bernoulli random variables given v ∈ IR, with the common conditional distribu-
tion {P1(B|v), P1(S|v)} given in (8.1). Therefore, the sequence {On, n = 1, 2, ...}
is interchangeable. Note that (unconditionally) O1, O2, ... are dependent with a
positive correlation. Symbolically, Bayes’ formula yields the posterior density for
the asset value Vn given the trading flow {O1, ..., On}:
fn(v|O1, ..., On) = f0(v) P (O1, ..., On|v)
P (O1, ...On)
=
f0(v)
∏n
i=1 P (Oi|v)
P (O1, ..., On)
, (8.5)
Theorem 4. The trading flow {O1, ..., On} is invariant with respect to any particular
order of O1, ..., On. If we let bn and sn denote the total numbers of buy and sell orders
respectively among O1, ..., On, then
fn(v|O1, ..., On) = fn(v|bn) = f0(v) [P1(B|v)]
bn [P1(S|v)]sn∫∞
−∞ f0(v
′) [P1(B|v′)]bn [P1(S|v′)]sn dv′
. (8.6)
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Proof. Given two order sequences, B1, S2 or S1, B2, we have,
f2(v|B1, S2) = f1(v|B1) Pr(S2|B1, v)
Pr(B1, S2)
=
f1(v|B1) Pr(S2|v)∫∞
−∞ f1(v|B1) Pr(S2|v)dv
=
f0(v)[µ
eβv
1+eβv
+ 1−µ
2
][µ 1
1+eβv
+ 1−µ
2
]∫∞
−∞ f0(v)[µ
eβv
1+eβv
+ 1−µ
2
][µ 1
1+eβv
+ 1−µ
2
]dv
=
f1(v|S1) Pr(B2|v)∫∞
−∞ f1(v|S1) Pr(B2|v)dv
=
f1(v|S1) Pr(B2|S1, v)
Pr(B2, S1)
= f(v|S1, B2),
Replace f0(v) with fn−1(v) gives the proof by induction.
Because the posterior densities depend on the trading record path O1, ..., On only
through a 1D summary statistic bn (or sn). Now we have a general formula for the
posterior density:
fn(v|bn) = f0(v) [P1(B|v)]
bn [P1(S|v)]n−bn∫∞
−∞ f0(v
′) [P1(B|v′)]bn [P1(S|v′)]n−bn dv′
. (8.7)
The following theorem states that the bid and ask price quotes converge over time
to the true value.
Theorem 5. Suppose v = v∗, let askn and bidn denote bid and ask price after nth
trade, for n = 1, 2..., then they converge exponentially to v∗.
lim
n→∞
askn = lim
n→∞
bidn = v
∗ a.s. (8.8)
Proof. Given  > 0, let P (v), ∀v ∈ (−∞,∞) denote the probability of v at interval
[v − , v + ]. If we let bn and sn denote the total numbers of buy and sell orders
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respectively among O1, ..., On. For v = v
′, we have,
Pn(v
′) =
∫ v′+
v′−
fn(v|bn)dv,
Pn(v
′)
Pn(v∗)
=
f0(v
′) [P1(B|v′)]bn [P1(S|v′)]sn
f0(v∗) [P1(B|v∗)]bn [P1(S|v∗)]sn ,
Take logarithm,
1
n
log
Pn(v
′)
Pn(v∗)
=
1
n
log
f0(v
′)
f0(v∗)
+
bn
n
log
P1(B|v′)
P1(B|v∗) + (1−
bn
n
) log
P1(S|v′)
P1(S|v∗) , (8.9)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (8.9) is 0 as n→∞.
Since v = v∗, by Strong Law of Large Numbers,
bn
n
→ P1(B|v∗) as n→∞
Similarly, sn/n → P1(S|v∗) as n → ∞, Let P1(B|v∗) = q, q ∈ [0, 1] which is fixed for
v = v∗. Also let P1(B|v′) = y, y ∈ [0, 1] which is random ∀v′, equation (8.9) could be
written as,
1
n
log
Pn(v
′)
Pn(v∗)
→ f(y) = q log y
q
+ (1− q) log 1− y
1− q as n→∞,
f ′(y) =
q
y
− 1− q
1− y = 0,
y∗ = q,
f”(y) =
−q
y2
− 1− q
(1− y)2 < 0,
indicates y∗ is maximum.
f(y) < f(q) = 0, (y 6= q)
Pn(v
′)
Pn(v∗)
→ 0 as n→∞ ∀v′ 6= v∗,
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It follows that, limn→∞ askn = limn→∞ bidn = v∗ exponentially a.s.
We can summarize the results so far in
Theorem 6. Let Y = {(bn, Vn) : n = 0, 1, 2, ...} and b0 = 0.
[1] Y is a Markov chain over the state space IN+ × IR where IN+ = {0, 1, 2, ...}, whose
transition probability function is given by (8.7) and
P (bn+1|v, bn) = [P1(B|v)]bn+1−bn [P1(S|v)]1−(bn+1−bn). (8.10)
[2] V0, V1, ... are iid N(p0,Σ0) random variables.
[3] O1, O2, ... are interchangeable random variables with a constant correlation
corr(Oi, Oj) = ρ ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j. More specifically, O1, O2, ... are a mixture of iid
random variables, i.e. they are iid conditioning on V0 = v.
[4] The (predicted) ask price and bid price after n trades are given by
An = E(Vn|bn−1, On = B), (8.11)
Bn = E(Vn|bn−1, On = S). (8.12)
Given v = v∗ (insider knows v∗), they converge exponentially to v∗ as n→∞.
2: The second extension of G-M model
In the first extended G-M model, an over-simplified assumption is every order (buy
or see) has to be of size one. Apparently, variable trading volumes affect the fluctuation
of asset prices, and should not be ignored in market microstructure studies. Now we
propose another extension of G-M model that incorporates trading volumes.
Let the same notation On represent the (signed) volume (# of shares) in the nth
trade, where the sign indicates the direction of order imbalance: On > 0 (resp. On < 0)
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corresponds to a net “buy order” (resp. “sell order”) effect. We basically follow the
formulation in the first extended G-M model except for defining On’s as continuous
random variables and making related adjustments accordingly.
• With µ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the proportion of informed traders, we still assume one
trading order is processed per unit time. Suppose V0 ∼ N(p0,Σ0) with the density
f0(·).
• Given V0 = v, suppose On, n = 1, 2, ... are conditionally iid with a common condi-
tional density (as a mixture of two normal densities) defined by
g1(u|v) = µ gI1(u|v) + (1− µ) gU1(u|v), (8.13)
where
gI1(· |v) ∼ N(µI(v), σ2I (v)) and gU1(· |v) ∼ N(0, σ2U) (8.14)
for an informed trader and a noise trader respectively.
• Once again, given the trading volume history Oi = ui, i = 1, ..., n, Bayes’ formula
yields the posterior density for the asset value Vn:
fn(v|u1, ..., un) = f0(v)
∏n
i=1 g1(ui|v)∫∞
−∞ f0(v
′)
∏n
i=1 g1(ui|v′) dv′
. (8.15)
However, (8.15) is not as practically useful as (8.7) due to the lack of summary
statistics such as bn in (8.7). Consequently, the posterior density becomes gen-
uinely path-dependent. As more and more trades are made, the required memory
grows exponentially, which makes the updating intractable.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
This thesis studies market microstructure models at high frequency tick level. We
propose a novel dynamic Bayesian model derived from Kyle’s microstructure framework
in which informational asymmetries and liquidity needs motivate trade. Bayesian infer-
ence allows us to interpret the economic impacts of certain parameters contained in the
model. A new algorithm is developed to characterize Kyle’s solution with a significant
reduction in computational complexity when the model is expanded to encompass the
real data. The empirical studies on NYSE TAQ data illustrate the applications of Kyle’s
model and our dynamic model. The approach developed in this thesis can be extended
to characterize variation of microstructure models and other dynamic determinants.
The dynamic model is estimated and tested for intraday data on five randomly
chosen stocks over four different sample periods. Our study focuses on informed trading
between two consecutive quarterly earning announcement. The test of our dynamic
model indicates that the specification is broadly consistent with the original Kyle’s
model through simulation, while our dynamic model performs vastly better than the
equilibrium solution in real data. This work is subject to future validation with new
measures and compared against other microstructure models.
The magnitude of trading intensity βn from Bayesian inference provides interesting
implications of insider’s strategies, while we do not find persuasive influence of market
depth λ−1n through our dynamic model. In the meantime, we observe strong persis-
tency in the order imbalance volatility. The GARCH(1,1) modification is a prominent
candidate to embrace such property. We develop our GARCH dynamic model and
implement it with empirical data analysis. The results are promising. The impact
could be substantial to explain high volatility persistency measures founded in both
price evolution and order flows. Thus, future research in this area is likely to stem from
theoretical work that bridge equilibrium solution and GARCH dynamic model, and the
interplay between price and order imbalance volatility processes.
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Appendix
A: Proof of Proposition 1:
First of all, we show by backward induction that λn, αn, βn are nonnegative for all
n. Starting from the second order condition (5.14) and αN = 0 we have λN > 0, which
plus (5.9) implies αN−1 > 0. Then λN−1 > 0 and αN−1λN−1 < 1 would follow from
(5.14), etc. This argument shows αn > 0 for n = N − 1, N − 2, ..., 1 and λn > 0 for
n = N,N − 1, ..., 1. Furthermore, (5.12) implies βn > 0 ∀ n.
Next, with dn = αnλn, it follows from (5.9) that
αn−1 =
1
4λn(1− dn) , and
dn−1 = αn−1λn−1 =
λn−1
4λn(1− dn) , (A1)
which implies
λn
λn−1
=
1
4 dn−1(1− dn) . (A2)
From (5.12), we have
λn
λn−1
=
βn
βn−1
Σn
Σn−1
. (A3)
Plugging (5.13) in (A3) yields
λn
λn−1
=
βn
βn−1
(1− βnλn∆tn). (A4)
Note that (5.11) implies
βn ∆tn =
1− 2dn
2λn (1− dn) , (A5)
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from which substituting βn and βn−1 into (A4) leads to
λn
λn−1
=
1− 2dn
2λn (1− dn)
2λn−1 (1− dn−1)
1− 2dn−1
1
2(1− dn) , (A6)
and
λ2n
λ2n−1
=
1− 2dn
2(1− dn)2
1− dn−1
1− 2dn−1 . (A7)
Squaring both sides of (A2) and matching (A7), we have
8 d2n−1(1− dn−1)
1− 2dn−1 =
1
1− 2dn , Kn, (A8)
which can be expressed as the cubic equation (5.16):
8 d3n−1 − 8 d2n−1 − 2Kn dn−1 +Kn = 0,
with the boundary condition dN = 0, KN = 1 following αN = 0. Furthermore, (5.18) –
(5.20) follow from (5.11) – (5.13) straightforwardly.
To show the existence and uniqueness of the solution in the interval (0, 1/2) to
equation (5.16) for each n, note that the definition Σn = V ar(v|FUn ) appears to imply
Σn < Σn−1, which along with (5.18) shows [2(1 − dn)]−1 < 1, hence Kn > 0 and
0 < dn < 1/2 for all n = N − 1, ..., 1. However, these assertions need to be justified
more rigorously via backward induction.
Rewrite (5.16) as L(dn−1) = R(dn−1) where
L(dn−1) = 8d2n−1 (dn−1 − 1), (A9)
R(dn−1) = Kn (2dn−1 − 1). (A10)
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Since 0 < dn−1 < 1 ∀ n by the second order condition, L(dn−1) < 0 ∀ n. Starting
from KN = 1, we have 2dN−1 − 1 < 0, hence dN−1 < 1/2 and KN−1 > 0. Successive
iterations between (A10) and (5.17) lead to dn ∈ (0, 1/2) for all n = N − 1, ..., 1. Note
for every n = N − 1, ..., 1, the first-order derivatives
L
′
(dn−1) = 8dn−1(3dn−1 − 2) < 0,
R
′
(dn−1) = 2Kn > 0
imply that L(dn−1) decreases in dn−1 ∈ (0, 1/2) and R(dn−1) increases. Observing
L(0) = 0, L(1/2) = −1, R(0) = −Kn < 0 and R(1/2) = 0, there is a unique intersection
between the two curves L(dn−1) and R(dn−1) at dn−1 ∈ (0, 1/2). Also, Kn is increasing
in dn and satisfies Kn > 1.
Finally, as for the monotonicity of sequence {dn}, notice that the graph of L(·)
remains unchanged in the interval [0, 1/2] but that of R(·) will change due to its de-
pendence on Kn for different n. More specifically, KN−1 > 1 = KN pushes the (vertical
axis) intercept for R(dN−2) downwards relative to the intercept for R(dN−1), which
implies dN−2 > dN−1. Following the inductive argument, we obtain (5.21):
1
2
> d1 > d2 >, ..., > dN−1 > dN = 0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
B: Proof of Proposition 2:
First,
hn =
√
2(1− dn−1) 1− 2dn
1− 2dn−1
easily follows from (5.20) and (A7). Since 1−2dn
1−2dn−1 > 1 and dn−1 < 1/2, we have hn > 1.
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Next, (A7) implies
kn =
√
1− 2dn
1− 2dn−1
1− dn−1
2(1− dn)2 .
Furthermore, kn > 1/2 follows from
1−2dn
1−2dn−1 > 1 and
1−dn−1
2(1−dn)2 > 1/4.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
C: Proof of Proposition 3:
To characterize the equilibrium solution for the case with noisy signals observed by
the informed trader, we rely on the same method applied to Proposition 1, instead of
Kyle’s original approach.
Define qn = αnλn, from equation (5.39)
αn−1 =
γ2
4λn (1− qn) ,
qn−1 = αn−1λn−1 =
λn−1
λn
γ2
4(1− qn) , (A11)
Which implies
λn
λn−1
=
γ2
4qn−1(1− qn) . (A12)
From equation (5.41), we have,
λn
λn−1
=
βn
βn−1
Σn
Σn−1
β2n−1
(
1
γ
− 1
)
Σn−2∆ + σ2u
β2n
(
1
γ
− 1
)
Σn−1∆ + σ2u
, βn
βn−1
Σn
Σn−1
W. (A13)
Let En−1(·), V arn−1(·), Covn−1(·, ·) and corrn−1(·, ·) denote the conditional mean, vari-
ance, covariance and correlation operators respectively given FUn−1. Since order flows
from the insider are much less volatile than the trades from the uninformed and the
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insider is actively hiding his trading behavior, V arn−1(∆xn) << V arn−1(∆un). There-
fore,
V arn−1(∆xn) = V arn−1[βn∆ (v − pn−1 + n)] = β2n (Σn−1 + a2nσ2 ) ∆2
= β2n Σn−1∆
2/γ << V arn−1(∆un) = σ2u∆,
which leads to W ≈ 1. (5.42) turns (A13) to
λn
λn−1
=
βn
βn−1
(1− βnλn∆). (A14)
(5.40) now becomes
βn ∆ =
γ(1− 2qn)
2λn(1− qn) , (A15)
from which substituting βn and βn−1 into (A14) we have
λn
λn−1
=
1− 2qn
2λn (1− qn)
2λn−1 (1− qn−1)
1− 2qn−1
2(1− qn)− γ(1− 2qn)
2(1− qn) . (A16)
Therefore,
λ2n
λ2n−1
=
1− 2qn
1− 2qn−1
1− qn−1
1− qn
2(1− qn)− γ(1− 2qn)
2(1− qn) . (A17)
Squaring both sides of equation (A12) and equating with equation (A17),
8q2n−1(1− qn−1)
1− 2qn−1 =
γ4
(1− 2qn) [2(1− qn)− γ(1− 2qn)] = Kn, (A18)
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which is equivalent to the cubic equation
8q3n−1 − 8q2n−1 − 2Knqn−1 +Kn = 0. (A19)
Note that the boundary condition αN = 0 implies qN = αNλN = 0. Moreover, KN =
γ4
2−γ ∈ (1/24, 1/2).
We then show there exists one unique root which makes economic sense. From the
second order condition from (5.44), we have λn(1− qn) > 0, then qn < 1 for all n.
Follow from equation (5.47), we have 0 < γ(1−2qn)
2(1−qn) < 1, which leads to qn < 1/2, for
all n. We could rewrite (A19) as
8q2n−1(qn−1 − 1) = 2Knqn−1 −Kn. (A20)
It is straightforward to show that there exists a unique intersection qn−1 ∈ (0, 1/2)
between the RHS function and the RHS function in (A20).
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
D: Proof of Theorem 3:
We follow a backward induction procedure. Denote the conditional mean and vari-
ance given F In by EIn(·) and V arIn(·) respectively. Suppose at the (n+ 1)th auction, the
insider’s expected profit satisfies
EIn(pin+1) = αn(sn+1 − pn)2 + δn. (A21)
Since pin = (v − pn) ∆xn + pin+1, we have
EIn−1(pin) = max
∆x
EIn−1[(v − pn)∆x+ αn(sn+1 − pn)2 + δn]. (A22)
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A linear equilibrium requires
pn = pn−1 + λn(∆xn + ∆un) + h, (A23)
where h is a function of ∆y1, ...,∆yn−1. Plugging (A23) into (A22) and evaluating the
conditional expectation,
EIn−1(pin)
= max
∆x
EIn−1[(v − pn−1 − λn∆x− h) ∆x+ αn(sn+1 − pn−1 − λn∆x− h− λn∆un)2 + δn]
= max
∆x
{[EIn−1(v − pn−1)− λn∆x− h] ∆x+ αn EIn−1(sn+1 − pn−1)2
+ αn(λn∆x+ h)
2 − 2αn (λn∆x+ h) EIn−1(sn+1 − pn−1) + αn λ2nσ2u∆tn + δn}.(A24)
Recall bn =
Σn−1
Σn−1+a2nσ2
. Note that for each n, the information set FUn−1 does not include
sn. We have
EIn−1(v − pn−1) =
Covn−1(v − pn−1, sn)
V arn−1(sn)
(sn − pn−1) = bn (sn − pn−1); (A25)
EIn−1(sn+1 − pn−1) = EIn−1[(v − pn−1) + an+1n+1] = bn (sn − pn−1); (A26)
EIn−1(sn+1 − pn−1)2 = EIn−1[(v − pn−1) + an+1n+1]2
= EIn−1(v − pn−1)2 + a2n+1σ2
= V arIn−1(v − pn−1) + [EIn−1(v − pn−1)]2 + a2n+1σ2
= V arn−1(v) {1− [corrn−1(v, sn)]2}+ b2n(sn − pn−1)2 + a2n+1σ2
= Σn−1 (1− bn) + b2n(sn − pn−1)2 + a2n+1σ2 . (A27)
Note: Compared to En−1(v−pn−1) = 0, (A25) shows a distinction between the informed
trader and uninformed ones.
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The first order condition in maximizing the future profit yields
bn(sn − pn−1)− 2λn∆x− h+ 2αnλn(λn∆x+ h)− 2αnλn bn(sn − pn−1) = 0.
Hence
∆x =
bn(1− 2αnλn)
2λn (1− αnλn) (sn − pn−1) + h fn, (A28)
with fn =
2αnλn−1
2λn(1−αnλn) and the second order condition
λn (1− αnλn) > 0. (A29)
From (A24), we can verify (5.39):
αn−1 =
b2n
4λn(1− αnλn) .
We claim that h = 0. In fact, the market efficient condition implies E(∆pn|FUn−1) = 0.
It follows from (A23) and (A28) that
E{∆pn|FUn−1} = h (1 + λnfn) = 0, (A30)
which implies h = 0, and also (5.40):
βn ∆tn =
bn (1− 2αnλn)
2λn (1− αnλn) .
It follows from the pricing equation pn = En−1(v| FUn−1; ∆yn) and the projection
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theorem that
pn − pn−1 = E[v − pn−1| FUn−1; ∆yn]
=
Covn−1(v − pn−1,∆yn)
V arn−1(∆yn)
(∆yn)
= λn ∆yn, (A31)
hence
λn =
Covn−1(v − pn−1,∆xn + ∆un)
V arn−1(∆xn + ∆un)
=
βn∆tn Σn−1
β2n(∆tn)
2(Σn−1 + a2nσ2 ) + σ2u∆tn
=
βnΣn−1
β2n∆tn (Σn−1 + a2nσ2 ) + σ2u
=
1
βn∆tn
bn
+ σ
2
u
βnΣn−1
. (A32)
Since the (joint) conditional distribution of the vector (v − pn−1, ∆yn) given FUn−1 is
bivariate Gaussian, (5.42) follows from
Σn = V ar{v − pn−1| FUn−1; ∆yn}
= Σn−1
{
1− [corrn−1(v − pn−1,∆yn)]2
}
= Σn−1
{
1− [Covn−1(v − pn−1,∆xn + ∆un)]
2
V arn−1(v) V arn−1(∆xn + ∆un)
}
= Σn−1
{
1− λnCovn−1(v − pn−1,∆xn + ∆un)
V arn−1(v)
}
= Σn−1
(
1− λnβn∆tn Σn−1
Σn−1
)
= Σn−1 (1− λnβn∆tn).
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Now (A32) and (5.42) imply
λnβn∆tn
bn
+
λnσ
2
u
βnΣn−1
= 1,
and
λnβ
2
n∆tn
(
b−1n − 1
)
Σn−1 + λnσ2u = βnΣn,
which turns to (5.41) easily.
Finally, collecting relevant terms in (A24) entails
δn−1 = δn + αnλ2n σ
2
u∆tn + αn(1− bn) Σn−1 + αn a2n+1σ2 . (A33)
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